Bradley: Locke and Property Rights

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While the first four chapters of his Second Treatise were very interesting, I was most intrigued by Locke's account of property rights in the fifth chapter. His argument attempts to mesh together the fundamental principles described earlier (e.g., State of Nature, State of War, etc.) to tackle a particular issue. Locke begins his argument with the premise that all men have equal rights regarding the provisions of the earth as God gave these provisions to "mankind in common" (Section 26). This premise reveals Locke's conception of equality and leads to his discussion of the importance of labor in defining property rights. According to Locke, when one adds "the labor of his body, and the work of his hands" (Section 27) to the fruits of the earth, the fruits are removed from the State of Nature and become his property. He extends his argument by noting limitations on the amassing of these fruits, stating that these fruits should be used "to any advantage of life before [they] spoil" (Section 31). 

At first, these basic premises of Locke's argument may seem sound as they outline the acquisition and regulation of property. But as Locke continues to advance his argument, his ideas begin to become contradictory, creating a clear discrepancy between the notion of equality he initially proposes with a (quite God-centered) rationale and his leniency regarding "unequal possession of the earth" (Section 50). First, Locke states that God has given us the fruits of the earth for us "to enjoy" (Section 31). I must respond to this by asking: if I were to repeatedly obtain (and briefly tend to) immense groups of free cattle, then exchange the cattle for valuable diamonds and thus achieve a sense of enjoyment, would I not be acting against Locke's notion of equality in property rights? Locke even states that one could "exchange his sheep for...a diamond...[and] heap up as much of these durable things as he pleased" (Section 46). I find this claim to be incompatible with Locke's earlier claim that men should have equal access to the fruits of the earth. 

This discussion becomes even more troubling when the topic of land itself is in question. Again, Locke rationalizes that "it is labor then which puts the greatest part of value upon land" (Section 43). In line with Locke's logic, if Professor Hurley and I were to agree to start a farm on a free plot of land, and I arrive at and tend the land before Professor Hurley only to decide that I want the land for myself only, I would be able to declare the land as my property. Is this not problematic and conducive to inequality, especially considering that Professor Hurley could have benefitted from working on the land? One could attempt to refute this by stating that I would be "straitening" (Section 36) Professor Hurley by acting in self-interest. But would I truly be doing so if a contract were not and could not--due to the Law of Nature--established beforehand? 

Locke ends his fifth chapter by simply accepting that "men have agreed to a disproportionate and unequal possession of the earth" (Section 50) by "hoarding up [gold, silver, and other valuables] without injury to anyone" (Section 50). While this holds true, I believe that the inconsistency in Locke's argument, especially that regarding the notion of equality, notably weakens it. 


Comments

  1. Livia HughsonJanuary 19, 2023 at 8:11 AM

    I agree with you Bradley. Throughout this treatise, there appears to be some contradictory ideas that Locke's makes on property rights. Within your blog most, you mentioned Locke's notion of equality, and how it fails to translate to mans acceptance of a "disproportionate and unequal possession of the earth" (Locke 29). This is one way we might reconcile with this inconsistency:. At the beginning (of the word), men should have equal access to the earth BUT overtime it is labor which distinguishes our ownership of property. However, one's ownership of land does not mean that they are the SOLE beneficiary of the products produced from that land. Much like the invention of money enables humans to exchange and accumulate property, it also enables humans to exchange goods and products. We are all in a position to gain if we are able to access goods that we might not have otherwise had access to. I imagine that Locke pushes for equality and enjoyment of land within bounds. The first bound is within the development of word itself, the second is within the bound of a singular government, the third bound being multiple governments, etc. Perhaps it changes as our systems grow developed? We begin to exchange equality for security, for access to goods, etc

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