(Camille) Harris: Definitions, Customs, and Legitimation

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What fascinated me the most about this reading was Harris’ account of the relationship between power, customs, reification, legitimation, and the law. Based on her argument, a harmful evolution exists of concepts like whiteness becoming reified through customs and legitimated into law. The consequence of this process is that “the law masks what is the chosen as natural; it obscures the consequence of social selection as inevitable” (1777). Even though “whiteness” began as an “ideological proposition imposed through subordination of ‘others,’” it has acquired a meaning and privilege that operates with “phantom objectivity” (1730). This then makes it harder to challenge deeply ingrained customs and laws that have become masked with the veil of being “natural.” Harris asks us to examine the “dynamic and multifaceted relationship among custom, command, and law” (1727). Two examples that illustrate this concept are the seizures of Mashpee land and the use of arguments around “merit” or intelligence in affirmative action debates. In the Mashpee case, the tribe’s land was immorally seized because it was decreed that the Mashpee did not have a legitimate claim to the land based on group identity. However, this ruling and definition of property rights were constructed by white colonizers. As Harris describes, “fundamentally, then, the external imposition of definition maintained the social equilibrium that was severely challenged by the Mashpee land claims” (1765). This subjugation was masked under the seemingly objective facts/rights of who can lay claim to property; however, those are based on customs, assumptions, and definitions created by subjective (and often oppressive) groups. So, property rights or constructions of race are not biological, natural, or objective; they are inherently social and political constructs. Since definitions are often a central part of domination, “what must be addressed is who is defining, how the definition is constructed, and why is the definition being propounded” (1763). Another example is affirmative action and the political weaponization of definitions around “merit” and intelligence. Bakke claimed he suffered injury by being denied admission despite being “better qualified.” His attorneys cited GPA and MCAT scores as sources of these “objective” measurements. The problem is that merit and intelligence are highly ambiguous, and the specific tools of standardized tests are a simplified and incomplete reification of their scope. Additionally, wealthier white people likely created these tools and measurements of “objectivity.” But, when these concepts become cemented into constructs and definitions, they establish norms that become the basis of laws. Harris’ reading reminds us of the importance of critical examination and questioning the basis of customs, ideas, and the “natural” way of things.

Comments

  1. Henry LongJanuary 25, 2023 at 10:55 PM

    I also found Harris's discussion of the social construction of property rights to be fascinating. That said, I wonder: if property rights are "inherently social and political" and not "natural, or objective" what can actually legitimate (or delegitimate) a claim to property?

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  2. Ella SmithJanuary 26, 2023 at 8:48 AM

    I also found the tensions and overlaps between custom, law, and culture regarding race intriguing. I found Harris’ emphasis on the importance of culture particularly intriguing. There are many different ways to define property, as Harris says, and as we have studied. Smith affirms that property only exists in a political society, whereas Locke affirms that property exists in nature, but is formalized as a protected right in the laws of a political society.

    In a certain sense, though, Harris argues that the definition of property that one follows does not matter when it comes to defining whiteness as property. Going back to the discussion on seizure of Native American land (or property), Harris states that this historical instance “established a pattern—a custom—of valorizing whiteness… Regardless of which theory of property one adopts, the concept of whiteness—established by centuries of custom (illegitimate custom, but custom nonetheless) and codified law—may be understood as property interest” (1728). Here, Harris is essentially arguing that custom transcends any formal definition one may hold of property. I think this is a really interesting point to consider, because in our class, we are debating many concepts of humanity and how they should be defined and/or protected. But we are human, and regardless of formal laws and definitions, culture transcends intended law. However, that begs the question (as Camille discusses), what came first, the culture or the law? Did the law create the culture, or was the culture codified by law? It does not seem that Harris has one firm answer (a firm answer may not even exist), but the tensions and overlaps between culture and law persist nonetheless.

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  3. HurleyJanuary 26, 2023 at 10:20 AM

    Really interesting exchange! I think that it is also interesting to bring Smith into this picture. Smith suggests that as societies evolve they go through stages of property relations, e.g. that at one point they recognize private property in animals (e.g. herds), but not yet in land. The land is held in commons, and the privately owned herds are grazed on them. Later development leads to recognition of private property in land as well as animals. What would happen if a group at the 2nd stage of development encountered a group at the first stage? In particular, what would happen if the group at the second stage took their customary practices to be grounded in eternal law and binding on everyone, including the 2nd group?

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