Inalienable Work and Its Worth

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     In the section “The Property Functions of Whiteness,” Harris responds to a counterargument regarding why whiteness might not be considered a property. The argument against Harris is that property has been traditionally considered “fully alienable,” and since whiteness is not transferable, then whiteness cannot be considered a property.

    Harris counter-argues that although property historically has been seen as an alienable entity, many inalienable entities can and have been assigned some property value. Harris uses the example of divorce court and how degrees utilized by one partner but paid by the other are entities to that courts can assign value. Therefore, whiteness being inalienable does not negate its function as property, but instead, as Harris writes, “paradoxically, its inalienability may be more indicative of its perceived enhanced value, rather than its disqualification as property.” (1734) Therefore, as Harris makes clear, it is the very nature that whiteness cannot be “transferred” that makes a type of property and one that is valued above others. Harris is calling out the norm that society upholds work that can be “deliverable” and transferable, not work that stands alone. 


    Continuing with this line of thinking, Harris’ counterargument reminded me of another aspect of societal property considered inalienable and undervalued: domestic housework. Domestic household is much work, and considering both Locke’s and Harris’ definitions of property, one of the most intimate extensions of property that people engage with, both effort and societal wise. Therefore, if the household is one, if not the symbol of property, then why is domestic housework done within not included in our GDP calculations? A country’s GDP measures all goods and services produced, with these being alienable entities, their transference easily tracked. When it comes to unpaid work, like stay-at-home moms, and the lack of money transfer present, then that work, or “property,” is inalienable and devalued. There is no set “transferable” price for the goods and services domestic housework provides; its effects are felt long-term and seen subtly. Therefore since there is no clear way to determine the transferable value of housework, its entire value is voided. 


    Domestic housework not being included in a country’s GDP calculation is a clear example of societies valuing alienable, transferable work over more “vague” work. It is clear that there is a societal preference for recognizing and uplifting transferable work, which harms and devalues non-transferable work and the people behind it. Instead, we should reorient our society to value work that has transferable, quantitative, and, additionally, non-transferable qualitative value. As Harris writes that whitenesses’ inalienability makes it more valuable, the same viewpoint can be applied to other forms of “inalienable property.” Extending the conversation from domestic housework, let us consider the inalienable right biological women have to bear children. Since the “right” to have children cannot be transferred from biological women to others, as Harris writes, if biological women choose to exercise this right, society should shift to valuing this type of property more. In other words, since being a biological woman is inalienable, the right to bear children should be further upheld and valued. Shifting our thinking to value inalienable more than alienable work can help remedy the undervaluation of certain societal works and the groups behind them.

Comments

  1. Henry LongJanuary 26, 2023 at 11:07 AM

    I wonder if there would be any difference between inalienable property and inalienable work. For Locke, work—or labour, as he calls it—is always inalienable: he writes "every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his" (Locke 19). Are there any meaningful differences between work and property?

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