Tutu: Locke and Smith

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    Locke defines the State of Nature as a state in which everyone has the equal right to do as they wish, as long as it does not impede others’ rights. As he states, individuals do not have the license to violate others’ liberties. Locke extends his point by stating that the State of Nature leads to the structure of natural laws observed by all, even if not understood. A basis for Locke’s understanding of property can be found in this explanation of natural laws.

    Locke emphasizes that for a common entity to become one’s property, one must insert some form of labor into the good. For example, in order to monetize and commercialize a reservoir, one must put in the labor of building a dam. Therefore, it becomes a natural law, or in other words, a norm, that whoever puts effort into the common good how to have claims to call it their property. If this stipulation of labor was not universally accepted, or in other words, a natural law, then property rights could not be established and universally followed. This would lead to a highly dysfunctional society. Therefore, the need for secure property rights leads to people joining a civil society.

    Depending on the government structure, one’s reason for “joining” a civil society might rely more on one factor versus the other. The reason joining is in quotations is because Smith argues that citizens do not really have a choice nor an explicit commitment to their civil societies. Smith argues less that natural laws inform and shape society and instead that men enter into civil society by force of authority and utility. In Smith’s framework, property is not established by labor but by birthright and by how the civil structures allocate common goods. Therefore, with Locke, there is more hope in acquiring and determining property due to individual needs and wants, versus with Smith, it seems more forced and less inclined to allow for meritocratic means of property. 

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