(Camille): Hierarchies of Virtues, Justice, and American Punishment

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     What struck me as most resonant in this text was Smith’s explanation of the varying degrees of virtues and the different considerations and requirements accorded to beneficence vs. justice. Smith writes that beneficence is the proper object of our gratitude but is a positive virtue, meaning they deserve reward, but should not provoke resentment if absent. Thus, kindness deserves our gratitude and praise, but we cannot coerce individuals into acts of kindness, nor can we condemn them for simply being neutral. On the other hand, justice operates as more of a negative virtue; you exhibit the virtue by not acting in certain ways that harm others. Therefore, upholding this virtue does not invite congratulations, but violating it provokes justified resentment.

    Consequently, justice is something that you can coerce and regulate others into abiding by. Similarly, justice operates differently in our own feelings of obligation. Compared to other social virtues, we feel more tightly bound to the observation of justice; Smith suggests that perhaps we are wired this way, like the harmonious moving elements within a clock, from the “wisdom of God.” Regardless of the origin, these sentiments and our gut behaviors/duties that get reinforced through societal treatment are essential for the function and health of a society. Again, the importance of these virtues exists on a hierarchy so that “society may subsist, though not in a comfortable state, without beneficence; but the prevalence of injustice must utterly destroy it” (86).

Although the origins of why we feel these instinctive sentiments might be unknown, it is interesting to consider our defense of these virtues and our actions to uphold their preservation. If a child were to ask, for example, why we should act justly (even if we could freeride off of other people’s justice and harmony), it can be hard to muster a satisfying response. Some say because without justice, society would be in chaos, and we have rational interests in preserving a functioning society. But Smith seems to take almost a Gauthier perspective, asserting that we do just things because they are just. He writes, “the concern which is requisite for this, is no more than the general fellow-feeling which we have with every man merely because he is our fellow-creature.” If you do these actions with the proper intentions, then yes, you reap the rewards of a harmonious and functioning society. But you don’t necessarily observe justice simply for the end goal of achieving the result of a well-ordered society. I would be curious to see how these concepts play out for individuals who haven’t been socialized (i.e., like a Mowgli from the Jungle Book type of example). How much of these feelings and duties are derived from a natural biological stance, and how much of it is learned through socialization practices and the consistent reinforcement of moral norms from society?

This reading also made me curious about its application to the current context and standards within the American conception of justice and the prison industrial complex. Smith makes it clear that punishment is the natural and merited consequence of resentment, which arises when someone violates justice and imposes harm upon another. This dispossesses them of their life, possessions, or expectations and ultimately disrupts the harmony and order of society. Resentment is given to us by nature for our defense, as a safeguard of justice, and retaliation is justified so long as it is reserved for certain purposes. We sympathize with the natural resentment of the injured, and the offender becomes the object of our hatred and indignation. This cycle and ecosystems of relations makes sense and works in the abstract or general, but it seems difficult to institutionalize. Imprisonment, our primary form of criminal punishment, seems to do an excellent job of punishing (perhaps in excess), but I think that an important part of punishment is also its rehabilitation. People display their hatred for someone who has violated justice to mark their action as wrong and validate the victim’s injury, but also to reset boundaries for civil society – which could have a rehabilitating effect? We have fellow-feeling for everybody, so could there be an expense to over-sympathizing with the plight of a victim at the expense of the violator, who, after all, is also a human with whom we share some sympathy?

Comments

  1. SambhavFebruary 15, 2023 at 11:56 PM

    Brilliant blog post. The hierarchies of virtues certainly become clear when he says "By being productive of the greatest good, they are the natural and approved objects of the liveliest gratitude. Though the breach of justice, on the contrary, exposes to punishment, the observance of rules of that virtue seems scarce to deserve any reward." (Smith, 73)

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  2. HurleyFebruary 16, 2023 at 10:38 AM

    Nice, fine grained account of some of the key elements of the contrast between justice and beneficence. And I think that you do a nice job of capturing one Gauthier like element of Smith's account -- we are outraged at injustice, and motivated to resentment, by the wrongness of the unjust action itself -- e,g, "it's just wrong to treat another person that way!" But isn't there an element of facilitating pareto optimal interaction as well? We don't aim, in acting, at mutual benefit, but isn't that what justice tends to produce?

    Also, Smith on punishment brings up a vast array of questions. Consider, in particular, his sentry who is put to death for falling asleep at his post...

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