Carlos: Smith and Gauthier - The Relationship between Justice and Virtues

Smith begins ch. III of this reading by reiterating his belief that "all the members of human society stand in need for each others assistance" (2.3.1.1). In rationalizing why a rational agent may seek to cooperate with others in society, self-interest and sympathies help explain these relationships. For Smith, cooperation within society can be explained "from a sense of its utility, without any mutual love or affection" (2.3.1.2). Society can be a tool to be used by individuals to further their own self-interests and maintain their self-preservation. Although cooperation in society fueled by love, friendship, and other virtues can lead to a wonderful society, Smith does not require that these virtues be necessary for a functional society. Instead, Smith only asks that a society uphold justice. For Smith, justice remains neutral to the "emotions of compassion" for the injured and violator, instead holding "compassion which [one would] feel for mankind" (2.2.3.7). Nevertheless, even when Smith does not require that virtues be a part of a functioning society, virtues provide justice its validity. Justice cannot act with vengance or ill will. Although justice remains neutral to both parties, it continues to act compassionately and in the best interest of humankind. Justice requires virtues to give it its validity while at the same time, justice protects the virtues that Smith lists but does not require of a cooperating society. Therefore, although Smith may not require that society uphold virtues like love and compassion, if we are to believe Smith in claiming that society requires justice, justice still requires these virtues.

Similarly, Gauthier explains that rational agents will choose to cooperate with one another in the hopes of optimizing utility. Gauthier's theory of optimization requires that the rational person leave behind the pursuit of the maximization of their utility and instead cooperate with other rational agents to achieve an optimal outcome. Optimization affords mutual fulfillment to all agents while also requiring that no agent benefits by harming another. This requirement, the Lockean Proviso, is where Gauthier makes his case for justice. The proviso is rooted in values of equality and love so when the proviso is practiced, justice is maintained and when the proviso is violated, an injustice occurs. Although the proviso's validity could be questioned for upholding normative beliefs, Gauthier believes these normative values get their validity through the use of the social contract. The rules of optimization are dictated by the values society chooses to uphold and believe in. So when society agrees to certain values to uphold in the process of optimization, such as the proviso, justice is also required to enter the equation. A violation of the proviso incurs justice but justice can only be valid if there are values to be upheld. Therefore, for Gauthier as well, normative values such as love, compassion, etc. are a requirement of cooperation. In order to have justice, values must be had to describe how justice is expected to protect people. 

Both authors provide different explanations for why people choose to cooperate, yet both reach the same conclusion of the relationship between justice and virtues. Smith's virtues and Gauthier's values explain how justice is meant to be practiced while at the same time, justice is practiced to protect the values agreed upon by the cooperators. We cannot expect to have a society that requires justice without it also calling upon agreed virtues and values. Justice and virtues rely on one another within functioning societies.

Comments

  1. A lot of interesting insights here comparing the two. But Smith is clear that justice IS a virtue, a virtue particularly aligned with appropriate (reasonable) experience of resentment. So when you suggest that "justice and virtues rely on each other," you seem to be saying, on Smith's account, that justice relies on, among other virtues, justice, and though you are surely right that in Smith's view the just person acts in the "best interest of mankind," doesn't she do so by way of appropriate experiences of resentment against particular individuals who have injured others?

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