Carlos: The Virtue of Self-Restraint

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A common theme I noticed in Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments is his argument for self-restraint or as he calls it, "self-governance". Smith explains that all humans feel some connection with others, leading us to generally want others to approve of their own passions and experience. Smith defines this feeling as sympathy, the "fellow-feeling with any passion" (I.i.1.5). Our selfish tendencies require that others approve of us in our passions. So, in our pursuit of more sympathy from our fellow man, Smith explains that there are a variety of passions that may garner more or less sympathy and how we might go about earning that sympathy. Generally, Smith believes that others must be able to understand our position from their own position. The observer must be able to "imagine the sentiments of the sufferer" (I.i.1.4), but as this is a difficult task, we generally have to "[lower our] passion to that pitch, in which the spectators are capable of going along with" (I.i.4.8) us if we want to earn their sympathy. As such, Smith argues that self-restraint is key to earning the sympathy of others. Our desire for sympathy is so strong that rule of self-restraint can dampen our excited passions and"[restore] the mind to its tranquility" in order to receive the sympathy of strangers (I.i.4.10). Almost everyone is affected by the rule of self-restraint in their pursuit of sympathy, however, when Smith gets to the point of ranks and riches, the rule is abandoned.

In the pursuit of sympathy, Smith argues that humans pursue wealth, power, and preheminence for the sympathy of others. Our desire for sympathy is "founded upon the belief of our being the object of attention and approbation" (I.iii.2.1), otherwise known as vanity. Once that person has achieved wealth and power in the pursuit of vanity and sympathy, those around him are "[admire him] for the advantages of their situation" (I.iii.2.3). Even so, due to this higher rank, the superior does not have to exhibit self-restraint (or any other virtue for that matter) as long as they continue to put on airs of superiority for those who consider themselves inferior. The self-restraint and virtues man once had to exhibit are now replaced with the constant awareness of the sympathies of others. As for the inferior man, they must now exhibit even more self-restraint and other virtues if they are to reach the same faculty as their superior counterpart. People with higher ranks can ignore the rule of self-restraint while those who are below this superior being have to practice self-restraint and other virtues even more. We are so controlled by our selfish pursuit of sympathies that although we could remove the superior (and sometimes do), we "easily relapse into [the] habitual state of deference" to those who are superior (I.iii.2.3). The system of ranks enables our selfishness to trump self-restraint and any other virtues we may have pursued before the system. And yet those with a lower rank still have to play at upholding self-restraint when others clearly ignore the virtue.

Comments

  1. Paul HurleyFebruary 9, 2023 at 11:10 AM

    Two great points here. One concerns the role of self-restraint, for Smith, in developing the reasonable or appropriate emotional responses that are a prerequisite for a happy life. The other concerns the distortion and abandonment of this virtuous restraint in the face of aristocratic rank. Both great things to explore further. Consider, with respect to the first, the idea of a person with a bad temper. They get angry when it is not appropriate to experience anger, and to a degree that is completely unwarranted in the circumstances. The person with a bad temper needs to realize that they have to get their anger under control -- only to get angry when the circumstances warrant, and to the degree warranted. Otherwise they will alienate friends and other loved ones, and be unfit as collaborators more generally. Isn't this just Smith's self-restraint?

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