Ella: Smith and the Inherent Selfishness of Mankind

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At the beginning of the reading, Smith seems to be giving a positive account of the nature of humanity. In section I, he outlines how we benefit and even search for the joy and happiness of others. By explaining an enjoyment of the joy of others, Smith insinuates that men are naturally caring and good-hearted. However, as I read on, it became clear that Smith is championing a view of human nature and behavior that is inherently selfish and, at times, ill-natured, regardless of its effect on others. This realization may seem obvious to readers other than myself, but it seemed worth highlighting as a driving force behind many of Smith’s points. 


In section I, when Smith explains that the happiness and feelings of others invoke our feelings because “By the imagination, we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same person with him” (9, 2). This “sympathetic” view of humankind may seem optimistic in the human connection it insinuates, but it simultaneously highlights an uncrossable boundary between every individual. While sympathy allows us to feel connected, we only connect to others through thoughts and experiences that we have ourselves. Furthermore, we sympathize with others due to the feelings their emotions invoke in us rather than pure awareness of their feelings. Such analyses of Smith’s theory of sympathy point towards an individualistic and selfish nature of humankind—whether or not our sympathetic reactions actually manifest selfishly, the driving force behind those reactions is self-absorbed.


Going beyond Smith’s initial explanations of sympathy, he begins to hint at the selfish nature of sympathy on page 15 when he says that we are not “half so angry with [friends] for not entering into our gratitude, as for not sympathizing with our resentment” (15, 5). In this section, Smith insinuates that negative feelings of resentment are a much stronger basis of connection and sympathy than positive feelings of love. The reason for this is not made entirely clear by Smith at this point, but it highlights a human inclination to strong, negative feelings over positive ones. 


In sec II, ch, Smith does a deeper dive into strong negative feelings. V, in his discussion of selfish passions. He affirms that “small vexations excite no sympathy, but deep affliction calls forth the greatest” (42, 3). Deep affliction is the greatest exciter of sympathy. Even intense feelings of joy and happiness are not as profoundly sympathized, with, which Smith explains by stating that “a sentiment of envy commonly prevents us from heartily sympathizing with this [great] joy” (39, 1). Essentially, we often have trouble connecting with others’ great joys because we do not like that the one experiencing such joy is not ourselves. 


Smith seems to counter the conception that we sympathize most deeply with sorrow at the beginning of sec III ch. II, when he states that “it is because mankind are disposed to sympathize more entirely with our joy than with our sorrow, that we make parade of our riches and conceal our poverty” (50, 1). However, his explanation does not demonstrate that we sympathize more with joy but that we usually create more opportunities for others to sympathize with our joy than our sorrow. 

Comments

  1. Paul HurleyFebruary 9, 2023 at 10:38 AM

    Ella, you bring up so many important questions. One is your suggestion that sympathy is selfish because it must go through us, through our imagination about us having these experiences. But that this demonstrates the "selfishness" of his account seems in need of additional support (unless you mean something VERY thin by "selfish.") For instance, Smith also thinks that we determine what things look like to you by imagining how things would look to us from your vantage point. Does that entail selfish or solipsism or self-absorbsion of perception? Or is it just to point out that I can't feel your feelings, or see through your eyes? Maybe with some additional premises we can get to selfishness, but what would those premises be?

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