Henry: The Locality of Sentimentality

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Adam Smith, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, argues that justice emerges from a bottom-up interpretation of our sentiments rather than from a top-down understanding of the general interest of society. In doing so, he reveals how our sentimental interests are inherently parochial and not cosmopolitan.

Smith begins by establishing that each man's primary concern is his own welfare. He writes that "every man is, no doubt, by nature, first and principally recommended to his own care; and as he is fitter to take care of himself than of any other person, it is fit and right that it should be so" (Smith 82). For Smith, it is necessary and proper that each man prioritize his own particular welfare. Taking a page out of the book of his good friend David Hume, Smith writes that people will be less concerned with "the death of another person, with whom we have no particular connexion" than "a very insignificant disaster which has befallen ourselves" (Smith 83). Notice, however, that Smith twice clarifies that our sympathy is limited only for those "with whom we have no particular connexion" (Smith 82, 86). We may very well have very great and moving sympathy for our family, friends, lovers, classmates, coworkers, and even our recent acquaintances. But our sympathy is severely limited for those outside of our parochial domain. Thus, Smith reveals that although men are "naturally sympathetic" (Smith 86), our primary locus of concern is ourselves, followed closely by those around us.

For this reason, Smith rejects the hypothesis that social necessity is the basis for our understanding of justice. Smith explains that when we see a delinquent flouting the "most sacred rules of morality... it is their intrinsic hatefulness and detestableness, which originally inflames us against them" (Smith 89). According to Smith, we only appeal to social welfare as a post hoc justification. Our indignation at impiety is instant and instinctual—not measured and reasoned. He explains that even though "it commonly requires no great discernment to see the destructive tendency of all licentious practices to the welfare of society, it is seldom this consideration which first animates us against them" (Smith 89). Thus, for Smith, our particular sympathies, rather than an overarching commitment to social prosperity, inform our understanding of justice. He clarifies that "our regard for the individuals [does not] arise from our regard for the multitude: but... our regard for the multitude is compounded and made up of the particular regards which we feel for the different individuals of which it is composed" (Smith 89-90). Thus, our notion of justice is informed by our sentiments.

Smith uses an example to reveal how the interests of society do not always accord with our understanding of justice. Smith introduces two characters: a sentinel who falls asleep at his watch, and a murderer who kills his father. For the sake of the social good, both face the punishment of death—the murderer for his crime, and the sentinel "because such carelessness might endanger the whole army" (Smith 90). Smith uses our reactions to these two punishments as proof that social necessity does not ground our understanding of justice. While we would be glad to save the sentinel from his punishment, we would be outraged should the murderer escape his punishment (Smith 91). Thus, Smith uses this example to show that social necessity is often divorced from our more instinctual understandings of justice.

Ultimately, Smith reveals that justice is a product of our more narrow sentiments rather than our more broad ideas about social necessity.

Comments

  1. HurleyFebruary 16, 2023 at 10:45 AM

    Really cool post, getting at some of the core issues of the final chapter. I wonder, though, if it is as simple as you suggest when you claim that "Smith rejects the hypothesis that social necessity is the basis for our understanding of justice." Here is one way to put the point. It is clear that Smith rejects the idea that social necessity or utility is the efficient cause of our motivation to act justly -- it is instead the intrinsic hatefulness and detestableness of the actions, as you say. But might they nonetheless be a central element in the final cause explanation of justice, and so of "our understanding of justice?"

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