Henry: Smith & Hobbes

From the very beginning of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith makes it clear that he wants to reject Hobbesian accounts of morality wherein "good and evil are names that signify our appetites and aversions" (Hobbes 100). In fact, the very first sentence of his work reads, "how selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it." (Smith 9). Smith rejects Hobbesian arguments primarily by demonstrating that self-love is a secondary rather than primary consideration when evaluating sentiments, whereas propriety is a primary and not a secondary consideration.

When Smith explains the cause of sympathy, he tries to preempt objections by "those who are fond of deducing all our sentiments from certain refinements of self-love" (Smith 13). According to the editor, "Smith presumably has Hobbes... in mind" (Smith 14). Smith predicts that a Hobbesian might argue that since we are aware of our own shortcomings, we delight in the sympathy of others because it indicates that they will come to our aid. Likewise, we lament when we are denied that same sympathy because it indicates we will not receive help. Smith rejects this reasoning since the pleasure of receiving sympathy and the pain of being denied it "are always felt so instantaneously... that it seems evident that neither of them can be derived from any such self-interested consideration" (Smith 14). Thus, Smith rejects an inferentialist account whereby we derive pleasure from sympathy after reciting a quick syllogism whose conclusion is that our self-love will be benefited. Smith argues that this model does not accord with the instinctual nature of the pleasure we derive from sympathy. For this reason, Smith rejects Hobbesian accounts of our sentiments.

Smith explains that, unlike self-love, propriety is a direct consideration in our assessments of sentiments. Smith writes that "when the original passions of the person principally concerned are in perfect concord with the sympathetic emotions of the spectator, they necessarily appear to this last just and proper" (Smith 16). Likewise, when others' sentiments do not align with our own, "they necessarily appear to him unjust and improper" (Smith 16). According to Smith, the justness and propriety of others' sentiments are necessarily entailed by their concord with ours. Thus, while self-love is a secondary consideration in the evaluation of sentiments, propriety and justness are primary considerations.

Smith also rejects utility as a primary consideration in the evaluation of sentiments. He explains that "the idea of the utility... is plainly an after-thought" (Smith 20). Instead, Smith writes that we approve of sentiments "not as something useful, but as right, as accurate, as agreeable to truth and reality" (Smith 20). Thus, the rightness, accuracy, and truth of opinions are what first recommend them to us. Self-love and utility, meanwhile, are mere afterthoughts.

Since the propriety of sentiments is the primary mechanism by which we evaluate them, Smith ascribes "two different sets of virtues" to aligning our sentiments with those of others: "the amiable virtues" (23), which entail "[feeling] much for others" (25), and "the virtues of self-denial" (23), which entail "[feeling] little for ourselves" (25). According to Smith, adherence to these virtues "constitutes the perfection of human nature" (25). Thus, since we evaluate sentiments by their propriety, we have reason to act in such a way that harmonizes our sentiments with others.

Ultimately, Smith rejects Hobbesian accounts of sentiments because they deal with self-love, which is but a mere indirect consideration for our evaluation of sentiments. In their stead, Smith proposes propriety (understood as harmony with others' sentiments) as the fundamental method by which we should evaluate sentiments.