Kirby: Retributive Justice in Exercising Resentment: Smith's Unstable Mandate

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    In Smith’s chapter IV, “Recapitulation of the Foregoing Chapters,” he argues the necessary means for sympathizing with another’s resentment or gratitude. In terms of evaluating the worthiness of resentment, Smith believes that one must divide this method into three segments. One, the “affection from which the action proceeds,”. In other words, does the motive or driving factor have merit in causing such an exercise of resentment? Two, the act itself must be in accordance with scaled retribution to the original harm done. And finally, we must determine the receiver of this resentment as the act’s “proper and suitable object.” (46) These terms help each man to properly evaluate the worthiness of resentment, to temper its reasonability and applicability. 


    In many ways, instructed analysis on the providing/receiving of gratitude or resentment goes to directly support Smith’s concept of natural societal bounds. He writes that we are constantly evaluating another’s trespasses or extraordinary acts. We do not need to have sympathy for everyone. Yet, naturally men recognize that the “union of mankind should be preserved for its own sake.” Our “natural love for society” drives us each to watch, carefully, for obstructions of justice. (55) This “main pillar” being justice is an innate principle of men in society–the lack of it would destroy all that man holds dear. And as such, the danger of one man’s unavenged injury creates a slippery slope for all in a community. However, Smith’s recommendations for analyzing another’s exercise of resentment seem to lack defensibility. 


    On matters of evaluating the exercise of resentment, including both the agent, the act, and the receiver’s propriety, we must be able to reason with each element ourselves. If we cannot, then Smith argues that “how fatal soever a tendency of the action which proceeds from them to those against whom it is directed, it does not seem to deserve any punishment, or to be the proper object of any resentment.” (47) By my interpretation, Smith seems to be saying this: no matter the extent of the evil expended, if we cannot identify impropriety of the agent and/or act, or propriety of the receiver’s reaction to that evil, then we cannot condemn this evil. Not only can we not condemn, but Smith writes that this evil cannot face punishment. We cannot support a retributive act of resentment. Essentially, the act could then no longer be defined as evil. 


    I worry how this resentment-evaluation structure aligns with the societal bounds Smith so strongly believes in. No matter the extent of an evil act’s fatal impact, if it is not improper, then it deserves no punishment? Here’s my attempt at a real-world example.


    Say a parent is speeding on a busy freeway, after having been alerted that their child’s daycare has an active shooter present. They are driving recklessly, fearing for the life of their child and the greater population. On the roadway, said parent hits another car, and continues driving onwards to the care center. The hit car spins out, killing multiple passengers. 


    Who evaluates the propriety of this act, or defines it as wrongdoing? Who determines the validity in seeking resentment? 


    Those who believe the car crash victims deserve justice regardless may argue that the evil act–the parent’s reckless driving–was improper, the actor obviously improper, and the victim’s resentment towards this evil as entirely proper. Thus the punishment of retributive justice should be sought to a full extent to the crime inflicted. Resentment is valid. 


    But another may argue that the act (the crash) and the actor (the parent) cannot possibly be considered improper in such a circumstance. That while the receiver of the evil (the crash victims) have been hurt, their position from a macro-scale perspective, lacks proprietary means for resentment. They believe that “how fatal soever a tendency of the action,” may be, that extenuating circumstances defer proprietary to the actor (parent). 


    No matter your position on the case, Smith’s argument that an evil act–one leading to death, even–may have no grounds for retributive justice stands undeveloped. Simply because we cannot reason with all three of a circumstance’s elements (propriety of actor/ act, and impropriety of the resentment receiver), then means of retributive justice are out of the question? 


    This seems far too general, too indistinct, and too wooly of a mandate. If one of three segments of the observer’s analysis cannot be judged valid (again, propriety of actor/ act, and impropriety of the resentment receiver), then resentment cannot be properly sought–evil not properly punished? Situations are often not this binary, and so I look forward to a more expansive approach on this matter during our seminar.


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