Livia: Smith "The Theory of Moral Sentiments"

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Perhaps one of the greatest attributes that sympathy enables for man is relief. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith highlights this quality when he remarks “he (man) longs for that relief which nothing can afford him but the entire concord of the affections of the spectators with his own” (Smith 22). Although Smith implies that sympathy is critical towards resolving man’s internal turmoil, it is interesting than man is willing to restrain himself such that he does not disturb the tranquility of other men. Man chooses to sit with that “silent and majestic sorrow”, where his sadness is only discovered by looking at the “swelling of the eyes, the quivering of the cheek, and in the….coldness of whole behavior” (Smith 24). It is this regard for other men which permits a balance within human nature.

When reading this exchange, I was curious about a couple of things:

First, how does man know when to restrain his emotions such that he does not disturb others and when does he choose to share? If engaging in sympathy will always disrupt man’s peers’ tranquility, does it reflect poorly upon man to share his emotions? Similarly, does it become a signal of strength for man not to share his emotions?

Second, does the “concord of affections of the spectators with his own” provide man with the same “relief” when he shares a negative emotional experience than it does with a positive experience? I bring this question up because it appears that Smith frames this notion of relief v. restraint within a negative context, indicated by language like “swelling of the eyes” or “quivering of the lips”, in which man attempts to hide his negative emotions from others. I think it would be interesting to consider how relief v. restraint changes within a positive context.

My thought experiment:

When I disclose a piece of negative information about myself to others, I feel unburdened, like I have broken a piece of information off myself and given it to someone else. However, when I disclose a positive piece of information about myself to others, I feel as though I am sharing said piece of information so that my peers and I can enjoy it together. Initially, it appears to me that relief from spectators is much more powerful in a negative context. Though I am not sure this is always the case. Perhaps when I share positive information with others, I might experience considerable relief because my ability to experience joy is contingent upon others’ recognizing and sympathizing with their experience.

Further, we can consider how a positive v. negative perspective changes when I choose to restrain from sharing information from my peers or not. When I choose NOT to disclose negative information about myself, my reasoning is relatively strong. I am aware that heavy information might weigh upon those around me, and negatively impact them. However, when I choose NOT to disclose positive information about myself, the reasoning is much less clear. Would my positive information not positively improve the mood of those around me? Initially, it appears that restraint should be more forcefully applied in a negative context. However, I am not sure this is always the case. Perhaps my choice not to share positive information is because I am aware that my positive information might poorly reflect upon the personal circumstances of those around me. Perhaps not sharing positive information enables me to better enjoy it individually.[1]

 

 

 


[1] Ok, so not in line here with my other thoughts, but another question popped into my mind. Are there cases in which is more optimal for man to not engage in sympathy? Would Smith say that this is rational?

Comments

  1. Carlos HernandezFebruary 9, 2023 at 12:40 AM

    I would think Smith would ask you to also consider who you are seeking sympathy from. Smith generally asks us to show restraint of negative emotions (i.e. sadness) when sharing with strangers, because we can't expect the stranger to care about our experience. However, with a closer acquaintance or friend, restraint is less necessary because the relationship requires the pair to care about one another. As for the relief felt when sharing positive emotions and the restraint required when sharing negative emotions, Smith says, "we readily sympathize with [joy]: it inspires us with the same joy" and "small vexations excite no sympathy, but deep affliction calls forth the greatest" sympathy (1.2.5.2-3). It is easier to share our joys with others because we are naturally attracted to joy whereas grief can be harder to share because we naturally reel from it.

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    1. Henry LongFebruary 9, 2023 at 8:41 AM

      From Muthu: Reading the passage you cited, it seems that Smith views joy as generally more proper to share, though it may not inspire great levels of sympathy. While grief is generally less proper to share, Smith says that in the right circumstances grief actually inspires the greatest sympathy in a listener.

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  2. Carlos HernandezFebruary 9, 2023 at 12:51 AM

    As for your footnote, Smith claims that we should not sympathize with anger because it "inspires us either with fear or aversion" (1.2.3.5) and "it is the greatest poison to the happiness of a good man" (1.2.3.7). Although he does provide exceptions for when anger has greater distant effects than immediate ones, he does warn against passions that simply have too great of immediate threats (like vices). (1.2.3.4)

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  3. Paul HurleyFebruary 9, 2023 at 11:02 AM

    I just got a book contrast from Oxford. I didn't really feel like I had gotten it, in some sense, until I had shared the news with friends, colleagues, and family. Livia's point about grief, and the unburdening of grief, seems deeply insightful, but there does seem to be something very distinct but very powerful about the insights regarding the sharing of joy. Thoughts?

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