Muthu: The Origin of Sentiments

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*** FROM MUTHU ***

I’m interested in where Smith thinks our moral sentiments come from, and the implications of this on his theory of morality.

Early in Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith talks about the origin of moral sentiments: “The horror which they conceive at…[others’] misery…arises from conceiving what they themselves would suffer, if they really were [in that position]” (Smith I.i.1.3). He seems to suggest here that even our compassion and sympathy for others ultimately come from our own selfishness. We condole with our friend who just got dumped because we shudder at the horror of getting dumped ourselves.

Smith goes on to highlight the influence of selfishness on our fellow-feeling: “[while hearing of another’s misfortune] the thought of their own safety, the thought that they themselves are not really the sufferers, continually intrudes itself upon them” (Smith I.i.4.6). Even when we are consoling others through misfortune, we constantly find comfort in the fact that it is not us who is suffering. The situations in which our companions need our fellow-feeling the most are the same situations in which, according to Smith, our fellow-feeling is most corrupted by selfishness.

From this, let me present three simple assumptions:

  1. Smith thinks fellow-feeling is rooted in selfishness.
  2. Smith’s theory of morality will be based on fellow-feeling.
  3. Much of morality governs our conduct towards other people.

If all of these are true, then Smith’s theory of morality is in danger. How can one base principles of conduct towards others (morality) on selfish emotions/intuitions (fellow-feeling)?

Even if Smith’s forthcoming theory of morality is not based on our fellow-feeling, I think this tension is interesting nonetheless. Smith seems to want to say that our fellow-feeling is altruistic, and exists for others’ sake (Smith I.i.2.1), but his arguments and examples suggest that our fellow-feeling comes from our self-interest.

Comments

  1. Paul HurleyFebruary 9, 2023 at 11:18 AM

    The first line of the book is, "However selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in nature, which interest him in the fortune of others. So he introduces these feelings explicitly in contrast to selfishness. He then uses the word "sympathy" to denote such feelings that are contrasted with selfish feelings, and, as you point out, basis our moral sentiments to a large extent upon such fellow feelings. Given that he seems explicitly to reject your first premise in the first line of the book, the question is why you take it to be a "simple assumption." There is a point to be explored here, but if anything it seems to be clear that Smith thinks he rejects 1. Shouldn't the exploration begin from this as a starting point, e.g. that fellow feeling is not rooted in selfishness?

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