Noah: Political Emancipation and Laïcité

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Regarding the concept of political emancipation in relation to religion, Marx claims that “if we find that even in the country of complete political emancipation, religion not only exists, but displays a fresh and vigorous vitality, that is proof that the existence of religion is not in contradiction to the perfection of the state."

Marx uses the United States to prove this point, and ask a general rule of thumb, I would agree that the existence of religion and political emancipation are not mutually exclusive. But there is some grey area within the definition of “political emancipation” that should be further explored to show how the concept can be used as a tool to privilege or discriminate against certain religions within an overall goal of secularism.


For Marx, political emancipation is occurs when “In its own form, in the manner characteristic of its nature… a state emancipates itself from religion by emancipating itself from the state religion – that is to say, by the state as a state not professing any religion, but, on the contrary, asserting itself as a state." The crucial part of this definition is that implementation of political emancipation occurs “in a manner characteristic of [a state’s] nature.”


In France, the concept of Laïcité or Secularism has come under fire in recent years. Laïcité is a constitutional principle that is commonly understood to discourage religious involvement in government affairs, but its effect far surpasses the separation of church and state that we are familiar with in the U.S..  While Laïcité was originally established to remove the influence of the Catholic Church from government in the early 1900s, its current iteration has been criticized for unfair treatment islamic religious symbols. To quote The Economist, “successive laws have (in 2004) banned from state schools and public institutions “conspicuous” religious symbols, including the Muslim headscarf (and crucifix) and then (in 2010) full face-coverings, including the niqab, from all public places” Even further, Courts have banned the Burkini—a full body-covering bathing suit primarily worn by muslim women—in public pools and beaches in the name of Laïcité. To me, it seems like blatant islamophobia that headscarfs are banned on school campuses but my French cousins go unquestioned when they sport their necklaces with a cross. But many in my French family is adamant that the cultural and national security issues in France warrant some of these bans, although other religions should be held to the same standards.


For France, implementing political emancipation “in a manner characteristic of its nature” has allowed a predominantly white nation to disproportionality inhibit the practice of islam with a blind eye towards its own hypocrisy. Even if states claim that they have no official religion, balancing the appropriate religious symbols or practices within a society can still give rise to discriminatory behavior. The grey area between public and private sector and what are considered “conspicuous” religious symbols gives politically emancipated states an opportunity to continue disenfranchising certain religions. 


Although the existence of religion is not a contradiction to the perfection of the state, Laicite has shown that the process of political emancipation for a state can be, paradoxically, used to discriminate against a minority religion. 

Comments

  1. HurleyFebruary 23, 2023 at 8:43 AM

    My puzzle here is that you seem to be suggesting a complication or criticism, but you seem to be doing so by making Marx's point about the limits of political emancipation from religion in delivering real human emancipation from religion. Wouldn't Marx take you to be making his point here?

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