Noah: Smith and Blackburn on Justice

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Smith differentiates beneficence and justice primarily by establishing that it is inappropriate to enforce the practice of beneficence by merited punishment, but is is appropriate to utilize merited punishment when Justice is neglected. Therefore, justice forms a stabler ground to establish human society: “it is the main pillar that upholds the whole edifice.” Smith also claims that if not for justice, men would, “like wild beasts, be ready at all times to fly upon [another], and a man would enter an assembly of men as he enters a den of lions.”

Smith also characterizes justice as a principle used in evaluating individual (rather than societal) problems. "That [justice] is not a regard to the preservation of society, which originally interests us in the punishment of crimes committed against individuals, may be demonstrated by obvious considerations.”

These "obvious considerations" include how our demand for punishment stems from a concern for the individual (rather than the general interest of society), and that this concern originates from a “fellow-feeling” which we always have with our “fellow-creatures.”


While I agree with Smith’s description justice as a general rule of thumb, I think Blackburn’s Ruling Passions raises some interesting questions about his account. Blackburn demonstrates that individuals can worry about societal justice as a primary concern, especially within a context of preserving society.


Blackburn compares the decision to carry guns with the prisoner’s dilemma to reveal how changing utilities towards an option of no one carrying a gun (“dove-dove”) can be also be a rational approach. Even though choosing to carry a gun may always produce a better outcome for the empirical game, in real life, it means everyone carries a gun, which makes society less safe than the cooperative alternative. The cooperative approach of not arming, when chosen by both parties, offers a safer outcome. This approach runs in direct contrast to Smith’s description of the “den of lions” waiting to pounce on the vulnerable. Though Smith claims justice is the primary force preventing a “den of lions” situation, Blackburn offers trust as a mechanism of moving individual utilities towards choices that better society. I think Smith should consider trust in his account as well.


To question Smith’s claims of considering justice within a personal sense over a societal one, I’ll even take the issues of gun violence a step further than Blackburn did. Smith would probably consider the forceful repeal of all personal weaponry (which Blackburn does not suggest) an injustice, but I think many—within the context of frequent mass school shootings—would prioritize this societal solution over the personal injustice mandated to their fellow creatures. I’m not fully convinced that humans instinctively view justice within a personal rather than societal context.

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