Noah: Smith and Schadenfreude

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Although schadenfreude—pleasure derived by someone from another person's misfortune—is not explicitly referenced in Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments, the surrounding dialogue around the causes of emotions provides valuable insight into the psychological origins of the concept and how to avoid becoming a victim of it. 

In order to exhibit schadenfreude, one typically needs to form a negative image of another beforehand. Though there are infinite reasons to become angered by another’s behavior, Smith provides an account of where the deepest conflicts lie: “though your sentiments in matters of taste, are quite opposite to mine, I can easily overlook this opposition… but if you have either no fellow feeling for the misfortunes I have meant with, or none that bears any proportion to the grief which distracts me… we become intolerable to one another” (15). Emotional incompatibly cuts far deeper into relationships than opposing views of “a picture, or a poem, or a system of philosophy” (15). Maintaining an appropriate “fellow-feeling” allows one to avoid becoming a subject of schadenfreude.


Smith later states that “joy is a pleasant emotion, and we gladly abandon ourselves to it upon the slightest occasion. We readily, therefore, sympathize with it in others, whenever we are not prejudiced by envy” (31). If emotional incompatibility is a factor influencing the target of schadenfreude, jealousy is a factor that influences the perpetrator: it seems to retract a proclivity for joy that we naturally exhibit among peers. This makes sense, as celebrating a friend who gets accepted to a college you have no desire to attend is often easier than celebrating their acceptance into an institution that rejected you. 


But Schadenfreude is the other side of the coin… rather than exhibiting jealousy for one’s successes, we take enjoyment from their misfortune. In referencing one kind of misfortune, pain, Smith claims  “pain never calls forth any very lively sympathy unless it is accompanied with danger. We sympathize with the fear, though not with the agony of the sufferer” (21). He uses the example of a toothache which offers little sympathy with great pain, and a painless life-threatening illness which generates great sympathy with no suffering. Perhaps the same can be claimed about schadenfreude: the dangerous consequences of the misfortune at hand (rather than the victim’s feelings) determine the extent to which we exhibit the emotion. It would make sense that taking pleasure in an adversary’s absolutely devastating loss in a Pokémon tournament seems more appropriate that something like a an early cancer diagnosis, even if (as hard as it is to imagine) she is personally more devastated emotionally distraught from the tournament. 


A final consideration for the construction of Schadenfreude is the humility of the offended. Smith claims that “an upstart, though of the greatest merit, is generally disagreeable, and a sentiment of envy commonly prints us from heartily sympathizing with his joy. If he has any judgement, he is sensible of this, and instead of appearing to be elated with his good fortune, he endeavors, as much as he can, to smother this joy, and keep down that elevation of mind with which his new circumstances naturally inspire him” (30). Smith makes clear how easily envy can arise from success, especially from those who flaunt their success. Staying grounded, as a general principle, will avoid the jealousy of others and keep an appropriate “fellow feeling” that prevents one from becoming the target of Schadenfreude. 

Comments

  1. Paul HurleyFebruary 9, 2023 at 10:45 AM

    Nice topic for exploring Smith. Reading your post, I find myself thinking just how complex the experience of pleasure at the pain of another might be on Smith's account. For example, if you swindle my friend in business, and your own business subsequently collapses (Bernie Madoff, for example), my pleasure or satisfaction at your demise will be an element of justified resentment. My suspinion is that Smith will have a complex account of when experiencing satisfaction at the pain of others is and is not appropriate, and what the appropriate amount of satisfaction is.

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