Smith and the Preservation of Society in Relation to Justice and Beneficence

By

In Chapter II of Part II of his Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith discusses the virtue of justice and the sense of remorse that arises as a result of violations of justice. He begins his argument with the seemingly empirical claim that "man...has a natural love for society, and desires that the union of mankind should be preserved for its own sake, and thought he himself was to derive no benefit from it" (II.ii.3). He then extrapolates from this that "we frequently have occasion to confirm our natural sense of the propriety and fitness of punishment, by reflecting how necessary it is for preserving the order of society" (II.ii.3). 

A striking claim arises: in having the disposition to save one who has been injured by another, man "counterbalances the impulse of this weak and partial humanity by the dictates of a humanity that is more generous and comprehensive" (II.ii.3). This begs the question: what justification does Smith provide for the notion that consideration of the "welfare of society" precedes, at least in reasonable importance, to our regard for individuals who have been wronged? Smith more clearly expresses this view later in the paragraph: "So when a single man is injured or destroyed, we demand the punishment of the wrong that has been done to him, not so much from a concern for the general interest of society, as from a concern for that very individual who has been injured" (II.ii.3).

Smith extends this argument by reasoning that this concern does not include the sentiments upon which the virtue of beneficence (e.g., love, esteem, and affection) are based. While I acknowledge Smith's commitment to his definition of beneficence, I fail to see the connection between this definition and the conclusion he derives from it. Is Smith right in saying that because our concern for a singular injured man is not rooted in beneficence, it is not to be considered as heavily as our concern for the preservation of society? 

I argue that Smith's argument here seems to follow a utilitarian line of reasoning in which aggregated utility (as conceived by "preservation of society") warrants greater attention than individual utility (as conceived by "the very individual who has been injured"). Is his justification of this--that the concern is not rooted in beneficence--sufficient in more strongly valuing society in its entirety when a member of society has been injured? 

I must note that earlier in Chapter II, Smith argues that "beneficence is always free, it cannot be extorted by force, the mere want of it exposes to no punishment" (II.ii.1). While this certainly bolsters his own view, I struggle to reconcile Smith's undervaluing the individual, especially when placed in the context of society in its entirety. Should we not be equally concerned about the individual's well-being? Wouldn't demonstrating this equal concern be conducive to greater sympathy? 

I want to end this blog post by recognizing that I struggle to distinguish Smith's empirical accounts from theoretical (or rather, suggestive) accounts. While it appears that the Smithian arguments outlined here are suggestive, I am open to hearing perspectives that are rooted in the assumption that Smith's accounts are purely empirical. 

Comments

  1. Henry LongFebruary 15, 2023 at 8:40 PM

    Great blog post. I would clarify that I do not think that Smith is making the normative claim that our consideration of social welfare should take precedence over our sympathy for individuals or that our concern for the preservation of society should be weighted more heavily than for a singular injured man. If anything, as I argue in my blog post, he seems to be illustrating the weaknesses of moral theories that privilege social utility as the sole criterion for evaluating justice. Ultimately, it seems that Smith is simply pointing out the tension between what he calls the "two great purposes of nature, the support of the individual, and the propagation of the species" (Smith 87).

    ReplyDelete
  2. Bradley KwonFebruary 15, 2023 at 10:10 PM

    Thanks for the comment, Henry. I definitely see where you're coming from (as my last paragraph points out), but it appeared to me--at least upon first reading Smith's account--that his claim is not entirely normative. I want to point to II.ii.3, in which he states: "We must show them, therefore, that it ought to be so for the sake of something else [in this case, the preservation of society." I think it is perhaps his use of "ought to be" that has been the source of confusion for me. Moreover, while not directly related to the topic at hand, he states in II.ii.1: "And upon this is founded that remarkable distinction between justice and all the other social virtues, which has of late been particularly insisted upon by an author of very great and original genius," almost suggesting that it is the author's genius that substantiates these virtues. This leads me to think that perhaps some parts of Smith's account are not actually normative, but I am more than willing to discuss this further during tomorrow's seminar.

    ReplyDelete

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

Livia: Táíwò and Economic Success in the Global South

By
  Reconsidering Reparations by Professor Olúfẹ́mi O. Táíwò illuminates the large extent to which racism and colonialism played in creating the current global economic structure, in which the global north dominates the global south. Additionally, this book highlights how current policies implemented by global institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank have further strengthened and reaffirmed this positioning. Taking into account this global historical perspective, we can better understand how “consequences flow from some other parts of the world to other parts, often across national borders, and in ways that complicate geographically and politically narrow ways of thinking about reparations” (24). Thus, some sort of international obligation of social justice must be exist. Táíwò’s emphasis on the role that slavery and colonialism played in establishing the current economic order makes me think about the signal which this sends to the Global South in the development of their p...
Read more

Carlos: Response to Henry's Conclusion

By
I've spent way too long trying to argue against Henry's point because it just seems wrong to conclude with "there is no current social framework by which we might call their lasting effects socially unjust–at least under the political conception of justice". Yet, the more I thought about it, the more I felt I had to agree with Henry's argument regardless of how strange it felt to do so. Still, I did have a few ideas as I was thinking of how to refute Henry's conclusion: -------------------------------------------- 1) With the hypothetical situation Henry provides, if we were to fully extend its logic to our current world, I think Prof. Hurley would have also created a division between the A and B group that would have maintained even into Tuesday. I think were that division were to have taken place, even after Prof. Hurley disbanded the government, the division would have remained and the hierarchy of power would continue into the rest of the week. It seems fa...
Read more

Smith, Locke, Harris, and Justice

By
 On page 79, Smith writes, "the violation of justice is injury: it does real and positive hurt to some particular persons," and thus it is a virtue that, unlike beneficence, warrants resentment if we fail to fulfill it. Upon reading this, I immediately thought, well how are you defining justice?  It became very clear in the following pages that Smith's conception of justice is nearly identical to Locke's Law of Nature. On page 80, he writes, "Among equals each individual is naturally, and antecedent to the institution of civil government , regarded as having a right both to defend himself from injuries, and to exact a certain degree of punishment for those which have been done to them." He continues to say that justice is only those transgressions which spectators would have the right to, and would be compelled to, punish whoever commits them. After this, he explains that no one has a right to advance their own happiness at the expense of someone else's...
Read more