Smith, Locke, and The Rights of Workers

While reading Smith’s Section III Chapter II titled “Of the origin of Ambition, and the distinction of Ranks,” I kept thinking about the relationship between capital owners and laborers. Smith writes a lot about why we as a society value the ruling class and keep them in place. Smith attributes this to the innate nature of sympathy present in all humans. Smith writes, “It is because mankind are disposed to sympathize more entirely with our joy than with our sorrow, that we make parade of our riches, and conceal our poverty.” (50)  However, Smith’s argument raised one question for me: what would happen if the public was better informed about how this system was created? In other words, if the general public learned that the ruling class set up this system to benefit them and actively recognized this, would public “sympathy” change so dramatically that the ruling class would no longer be protected? Locke brings up the issue of consent regarding an individual consenting to be ruled by a government. However, I believe his point can be extended to the question of an individual’s consent when it comes to society’s capital/labor sector. Suppose the general public becomes fully informed that they are operating in a capitalist system that exploits their labor. Would this knowledge be enough to overturn the “sympathy” felt to enact change? Smith writes, “even when the order of society seems to require that we should oppose them, we can hardly bring ourselves to do it.” (52)  Smith assumes that the public knows they are being exploited, but what if the public did not? Let us explore two situations below, one where both parties agree to their system of exploitation and one where owners agree but workers do not. Applying Locke’s theory of property to Smith’s theory of sympathy, I believe that questions of consent regarding capital systems, labor, and the fruits of said labor can be explored in lights that prioritize the right of workers to proper compensation.

Suppose the general theory of work in a society is that workers are not entitled to full compensation for their labor. Instead, the benefits go to the capital owner. If this knowledge was universally accepted, it could be argued that this system is fair since all participants agreed to this allocation of property. On the other hand, suppose there exists a society where the capital owners are cognizant that their workers are entitled to more than they are given, but the workers themselves do not know this. Then, for the workers, this becomes a situation of participating in a system through uninformed consent; they did not know they were entitled to more compensation, and therefore, the rewards for participation are unjust. I bring this thought experiment up because Smith, in his view, believes that the upper echelons of society have this conscious recognition that they are benefitting from a system they could not properly participate in. Smith writes that “[the man of rank and distinction] has an aversion to all public confusions, not from the love of mankind, for the great never look upon their inferiors as their fellow-creatures; nor yet from want of courage, for in that he is seldom defective; but from a consciousness that he possesses none of the virtues which are required in such situations, and that the public attention will certainly be drawn away from him by others.” (55)  In other words, men of “rank and distinction,” or the ruling class, avoid interacting in public spheres because they recognize they are lacking in skills/talents that those whom they benefit off possess. Additionally, Smith points out this fallacy in the thought of the ruling class that they both recognize they cannot possess these talents, but at the same time, “the great never look upon their inferiors as their fellow-creatures.” (55) Therefore, Smith points out that the ruling classes of society have acknowledged that they are profiting off of work they themselves could not do and, at the same time, view those that do the work beneath them.

Smith made me think about Locke’s point about labor and its connection to property rights. Locke argues that “The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.” (Chapter V 27) In connection to the point made above, it seems that the ruling class made of “ranking men,” acknowledge that others’ labor creates their property, but they lack the “skills/talents” to do said labor. Hence, due to this realization, the ruling class place their “labor” in more private circles, in a sense, hiding from the general public what they do. Therefore, if the general public is not informed of what the wealthy are doing, it becomes easier for their place in society to seem needed. If the working class does not fully know how the capital class is gaining their advantages, which is stated above as due to the fruits of labor, then as Smith writes, the general public, in confusion, moves to acceptance.

It is due to the general public’s sympathy that the ruling class is allowed to persist; as Smith writes, “We are eager to assist them in completing a system of happiness that approaches so near to perfection; and we desire to serve them for their own sake, without any other recompense but the vanity or the honour of obliging them.” (52) I believe Smith here is being a little unfair; it is not that people honor them due to obligation. People honor them because that is what they were informed to do. Suppose the general public is not informed or educated about theories like Locke’s and how one’s labor entitles one to property. In that case, they can more easily uphold the rank system the ruling class taught them. As Smith makes clear, “… to go along with all the passions of the rich and the powerful, [are] founded the distinction of ranks, and the order of society.” (52) Hence, the current societal system that calls for, what some might say, is an unwarranted sympathy towards wealth was created by the wealthy themselves. Therefore, it becomes clear that this situation might be one where one minority of the public created a system that disproportionately harms the majority to serve themselves better. Knowing that this system was created and not natural, the general public now might feel that they originally consented in an uninformed manner. Therefore, this system would be rendered invalid, and our societal sympathies might shift towards other sentiments. Instead of a feeling of sympathy towards not wanting to take from people, our societal sympathy might be redefined as seeking just compensation for the labor one put in.

My point here is that if one accepts Locke’s theory that one’s labor entitles one to property, then Smith’s chapter on ranks should be of great concern. Smith paints a society in which the ruling class is entitled to their privilege due to the lack of public knowledge that they created the system themselves. Smith writes, “Our obsequiousness to our superiors more frequently arises from our admiration for the advantages of their situation, than from any private expectations of benefit from their good-will.” (52)  Let us say the public learned that the advantages enjoyed are due to the “superiors” exploitation of the “inferiors” labor. With this clarified, sympathy might falter, and with this lessening of sympathy, the public might find itself more inclined to ask for change that benefits them. 

Bringing in Locke’s Second Treatise helps further points that Smith brought up. Firstly, the Lockean idea that one’s labor entitles them to some property rights helps highlight how messed up Smith’s point of the ruling class recognizing their inability to do said labor is. As mentioned above, Smith writes that the ruling class has an “aversion to public confusion,” because when they attempt to do the labor they profit off, they cannot. Therefore, in light of Locke’s theory, it becomes seemingly more corrupt that the ruling class created a system that profits off of labor they are unable to do, and to make matters worse, they have self-recognition of their inability to do said work, therefore, showing some sense of acknowledgment that they are claiming property rights to work they have not put labor into. Secondly, the idea that consent has to be informed brings into question the legitimacy of our current capital system. If laborers are entering a system where they might be entitled to more and they do not know this, then it cannot be said they properly consented. If they did not properly consent, issues such as the wealth gap informed by a difference in labor compensation now become doubly important to tackle due to the lack of consent. Thirdly, in connection to consent, Smith points out that the ruling class self-realizes that they cannot do the labor required for their profit and that they consent to a system where they profit off the labor of others. Hence, the unfairness of this system becomes more apparent, and the need to tackle this discrepancy, stemming from a lack of informed/universal, becomes critical.