Camille: Rawls and Affirmative Action

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I found it to be an interesting thought exercise to consider what Rawls’ conception and opinion would be on affirmative action. While I thought Rawls’ account was impressive, compelling, and instinctual, I believe the scope of application and practicality for an ideal theory of justice is limited. While it enables us to outline core values and discern when a society is unjust (noting when it falls short of the ideal), it doesn’t prescribe a remedy for rectifying or addressing the inevitable injustices within society. 

Affirmative action is a policy intended to address the unjust consequences of an unjust history in an unjust society. To say the least, we are no longer working within the ideal framework of justice. So what principles are reasonable to apply, and do the conditions of equality apply to people like Bakke or historically marginalized applicants? As Harris would argue, is it an insult to injury to only now adopt “colorblind” and formal equality measures to block affirmative action efforts when the law has always used race as a factor to discriminate against marginalized groups? 


I think that Rawls would support affirmative action based on its goal of achieving equality of opportunity for historically oppressed groups. For almost all of history, institutions have denied substantive and formal equality to Black people. Not only were laws and institutions applied unequally and arbitrarily based on race (violating formal equality), but the laws and institutions themselves were unjust in principle. 


As Rawls describes, the principle of open positions “expresses the conviction that if some places were not open on a basis fair to all, those left out would be right in feeling unjustly treated… they would be justified in their complaint not only because they were excluded from certain external rewards of office but because they were debarred from experiencing the realization of self which comes from a skillful and devoted exercise of social duties” (73). For all of history, Black Americans were systematically barred from equal chances to open positions, constituting an injustice. Affirmative action would work to secure the goods and equality that the principles of justice require and remedy the effects of their deprivation. In essence, it could change the current distributional practices to make them fair, and serve as a corrective measure for the present effects of past discrimination.


While under an ideal and well-ordered society, Rawls thought that preferential treatment was incompatible with fair equality of opportunity, these conditions do not fall under the ideal. Similarly, the original position did not allow for considerations and partiality based on any characteristic or identity (i.e., requiring the veil of ignorance). But those conditions operate under the hypothetical ideal. It seems necessary to override the veil of ignorance to ensure more just conditions, distributions, and access to open positions. 


In his book, Rawls writes that “social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all.” From this, we can conclude the principle of fair equality of opportunity. He later describes that “the expectations of those with the same abilities and aspirations should not be affected by their social class.” Obviously, the historical realities allowed expectations and aspirations to be affected based on social class and violated the principle of fair equality of opportunity. What becomes interesting is considering who is invoking/voicing this claim because, technically, Bakke was arguing that his expectations and opportunities were affected by his social class as a white person.


Finally, Rawls hints at this topic when he states that “chances to acquire cultural knowledge and skills should not depend on one’s class position, and so the school system, whether public or private, should be designed to even out class barriers” (63).


Although it doesn’t fall within ideal theory, it is interesting to consider Rawls’ interpretation of the justice of affirmative action. I believe he would accept it, given its aim to promote and restore the principle of fair equality of opportunity for marginalized groups.

Comments

  1. Henry LongMarch 1, 2023 at 11:43 PM

    Great blog post. Rawls would likely say that our present situation is "unjust" because the "higher
    expectations [of white college applicants] are excessive" and that "if these expectations
    were decreased, the situation of [minority college applicants] would be improved" (Rawls 68). Since Rawls believes that "the difference principle gives some weight to the considerations singled out by the principle of redress" (86), he would likely support some manner of rectifying the exiting unjust inequalities. That said, whether affirmative action in particular is an appropriate solution would become an empirical question for Rawls. If Rawls found affirmative action to be an effective manner of providing redress, he would be all for it. Conversely, if Sambhav's blog post from way back when is in fact correct that academics like Thomas Sowell "empirically nullify the case for affirmative action," Rawls would likely embrace more empirically proven manners of providing redress for those disadvantaged by the current system.

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