Carlos: Nozick and Rawls on Redistribution and Reparations

In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Robert Nozick lays out three principles that make up his Entitlement Theory. The Entitlement Theory informs what claims and non-claims people have to the holdings they have. I believe this (working) theory can provide support for the argument of reparations. Now, when I say reparations, I don't focus on financial compensations for those directly affected by injustice (although I don't deny the importance of this). Instead, I use reparations in a broader sense of restorative justice and the construction of new systems of distributing social advantages and disadvantages.

I believe the (possible) argument for reparations is largely contained in Nozick's third principle of the rectification of injustice. This principle considers events where either the principle of acquisition or the principle of transfer have been violated and then provides guidance as to how to correct for this injustice. Still, Nozick admits that he has not fully thought through these guidelines in his Entitlement Theory so much of the work of validating this theory is still left. Even so, Nozick does explain that his entitlement theory is based in historical principles of justice, meaning the theory considers how "past circumstances or actions of people can create differential entitlements or differential deserts to things" (Nozick 155). Using this basis, Nozick can extend the jurisdiction of his third principle to unjust historical entitlements that have yet to be resolved even in the present. For example, one can construct an argument that explains the manner in which British colonists came to hold Native American property goes against the the proper process of acquisition (yet to be) outlined in he first principle of acquisition. Additionally, another argument can explain how the trade agreements between the colonists and the indigenous populations were closer to fraud than they were to voluntary exchange as (it has yet to be) outlined in the second principle of transfer. Therefore, having violated both principles of the entitlement theory, the third principle kicks in. The third principle focuses on how to correct for these injustices committed, who is involved in the correction process, and even how far into the future people who are affected have a claim to the injustice. The third principle would also require that a best estimate "about what would have occurred ... if the injustice had not taken place" (Nozick 152) so that the rectification of the injustice reflects this estimate. This process delineates and provides necessary questions about the redistribution process, which could be argued to take the form of reparations.

On the other hand, although Rawls provides more concrete guidelines in the form of pure procedural adjusted justice for distributive justice in his unpublished manuscript of a "Briefer Restatement", avoiding the need for Nozick's third principle, his choice to ignore history in the original position also ignores the reality of living in an unideal society that has already failed at proper distribution. In response to Nozick's claim that the Theory of Justice does not account for the inequality resulted from the "accumulated results of many separate and seemingly fair agreements entered into by individuals and associations" (Rawls 42), Rawls revisits his theory to clarify that adjustments to institutions are inherent in his theory. Rawls argues that since the difference principle applies to public institutions, it is understood by the free individuals that adjustments would be a part of the institutions from the beginning in order to maintain fairness of opportunities and property. These adjustments represent gradual changes to certain rules to ensure that "system[s] remain fair over time, from one generation to the next" (Rawls 37). Through these gradual changes, the accumulation of property and wealth would be controlled as to not infringe on the principles of fairness laid out in the original position. Therefore, these adjustments, properly executed, would prevent the need for Nozick's third principle, eliminating the consideration of reparations as well.

Nevertheless, Rawls' theory of pure procedural adjusted justice has a difficult time dealing with the reality that unjust distribution permeates our unideal society and that redistribution may be necessary. Even beginning with Rawls' ask to discard personal characteristics, beliefs, differences, and background when entering the original position, his theory ignores the reality that injustices permeate and even uphold certain practices in our society. Ignoring history, as delineated by Marx in his materialistic history or by Olúfẹ́mi Táíwò with his global racial empire, also ignores the fact that unjust distribution has already occurred and that redistribution, possibly in the form of reparations, may be necessary to correct for that injustice. Rawls provides a powerful tool in his Theory of Justice and even prevents the need to consider reparations with his strategy of gradual adjustments to institutions but he falls short of providing guidance for when fair, just distribution fails. It may be that an addition to Rawls' theory similar to that of Nozick's third principle may help to alleviate this blindspot, but I also realize Rawls' theory is built to consider an ideal society.