Ella: Nozick on “Forced Labor” and Taxation

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Like Camille said in her blog post, the first read of Nozick was quite intuitive, and he clarified many of his viewpoints and defenses. But, what I have the most trouble reconciling is Nozick's view of taxation as forced labor. Summarized in one sentence, Nozick believes that people should have the right to their private property and not be deprived of it (unless under particular circumstances of rectification of injustice in holdings (152), which I will not discuss in this blog post). As such, taxation can be conceived of as an improper seizure of the property that one has created as the result of their own labor. From Nozick's viewpoint, taxation is, therefore, effectively forced labor. 


Nozick points out that the only way to avoid taxation of their labor is by making enough money to meet their basic needs (169). But, says Nozick, that would keep one from many pleasures and comforts, and thus the drive to labor beyond meeting basic needs in effect becomes necessary. From this point of view as well, people are forced to labor for the government or for "the purpose of serving the needy" (170), which once again affirms taxation as forced labor, according to Nozick. 


Nozick's arguments for taxation as forced labor are particularly weak because they ignore the position of contractarianism and the role of the State. As Locke affirms, when one enters society and leaves the State of Nature, they are giving up certain rights for a broader protection of their liberties. Taxation takes a part of someone's labor not necessarily just for serving the needy but also to effectively uphold systems of justice, infrastructure, and the economies that all citizens (in theory) benefit from. People who have been able to labor, creating property beyond their needs, have only been able to do so within the framework the State has created. Without taxation, that framework would dissolve. Taxation is taking one's property, but it is not forced from a contractarian point-of-view because one chooses to exist in and benefit from societal systems, especially if they are laboring to create the means for pursuing their pleasures. 


This explains why material pleasures are, in effect, taxed more than non-material pleasures—those material pleasures only exist within the societal framework. In his argument, Nozick questions why one who enjoys material pleasures (that would require more labor to meet) should have their property taken through taxation while one who enjoys non-material pleasures doesn't. Nozick explains his point of view by comparing the pleasures of going to the movies vs. watching the sunset. I would respond by saying that the movie theater, movies, and the work of the people who have created all the conditions for you to go to the movie theater only exist with society as a premise. Sunsets exist regardless of any person's labor and require no societal systems nor interventions to be enjoyed. Thus, Nozick's criticism of taxation seems to ignore the necessity of taxation systems and the integral structures that tax creates. 


(Also, in the time I was writing this, it seems Noah posted something on the same topic... oh well)


Comments

  1. Paul HurleyMarch 9, 2023 at 12:36 PM

    Really interesting place to enter into his argument. Nozick suggests that whereas taxation for redistributive reasons is not justified, taxation for non-redistributive reasons can be justified, e.g. in order to police the existing distribution. One way of understanding your argument is as suggesting that such non-redistributive reasons to "uphold systems of justice, infrastructure," etc are much more extensive that Nozick recognizes, and may justify taxation way beyond that he envisions in the minimal state.

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