Henry: A Challenge to Shelby on Work

In this blog post, I attempt to challenge Tommie Shelby's argument in Dark Ghettos that "the ghetto poor would not be wronging their fellow citizens were they to choose not to work and to rely on public funds for material support" (Shelby 176). I do so by invoking liberal arguments from John Rawls and Arthur Ripstein.

At the beginning of his chapter on work, Shelby makes clear his intentions to challenge the justifications for "mandating work as a condition of receiving welfare benefits" (175). Shelby explains that work requirements for welfare benefits are typically justified on the basis that work is "a moral or civic duty" (175). Shelby rejects this justification on liberal grounds, arguing that since "work... is a central element of a broad conception of human flourishing" (184), and no "liberal-democratic state can legitimately enforce any particular conception of the good" (185), then it follows that a liberal democratic state cannot legitimately enforce work ethic on the grounds that it promotes human flourishing. For example, Shelby explains that liberalism would proscribe an enforcement of work ethic on Christian or Marxist grounds (186). Thus, Shelby importantly clarifies the necessity of a right-based justification of work requirements.

That said, Rawls's framework in A Theory of Justice seems to leave room for an argument in favor of work requirements for welfare benefits. Rawls argues that even though a liberal government may not enforce a particular conception of the good, he does admit that "the basic structure of society distributes certain primary goods, that is, things that every rational man is presumed to want" (Rawls 54). Rawls provides the examples of "rights, liberties, and opportunities, and income, and wealth" (54). Work is a necessary requirement to obtain income and wealth. Thus, a society cannot ensure primary goods without most people working in some capacity. That said, Shelby rightly points out that "labor contribution from every one is not needed to supply essential goods and services" (Shelby 188). Regardless, work is a necessary precondition for people's ability to acquire primary goods.

Shelby argues that "if a person works only because he or she would other wise live in a perpetual state of material deprivation... it is hard to see the moral worth of such work" (186). But is not all work done to avoid a state of material deprivation? An individual is only obligated to work insofar as they need to do so to live. Work is necessary for everyone's survival and continued preservation. Shelby admits as much, saying that "it is hard to see how a societal system of cooperation could be sustained in a fair way if able citizens don’t have a duty to contribute to maintaining the material conditions of social life" (190). Shelby quickly dismisses arguments that "the ghetto poor of America could have been born into much worse circumstances" (194). But is not the option to accept conditional welfare better than having no available welfare? Thus, wouldn't a government be well within its right to deny welfare to someone who refuses to work?

Shelby then goes on to consider (and subsequently reject) three arguments supporting work requirements for welfare benefits on the basis of reciprocity: obligations of gratitude, mutual exchange for benefit, and fairness (187). According to Shelby, all three of these arguments "claim that all citizens benefit from what government or others in society have done and thereby owe something in return" (188). From here, Shelby concludes that "because [ghetto denizens] are so burdened by the structural injustices of the social system, they should not be considered free riders if they refuse to comply with a civic work requirement" (195).

Ripstein, in his Force and Freedom, rejects this line of thought. Ripstein argues that "the obligation to enter a rightful condition is unconditional, that is, it does not depend upon any particular person’s subjective assessment of the benefits it will yield" (Ripstein 258).  In Kantian terms, the person who is able to work but unwilling operates on a maxim that cannot possibly be made universal lest everyone starve. Thus, since the obligation to uphold a rightful condition is unconditional and work is a necessary part of a rightful condition, the obligation to work would hold irrespective of whether one benefits from the existing material structure.

Furthermore, I would allege that Shelby interprets the idea of benefit too broadly. Shelby alleges that the reciprocity arguments state that because the government "provides many benefits to citizens—physical safety, social services, secure possessions a regulated market, the rule of law, and so on," citizens are obliged to engage in "socially beneficial work" (187). But this argument appears to interpret the reciprocity citizens owe the government too broadly. It seems wrong to say that by mandating work as a condition of welfare benefits, the government is demanding work to reciprocate all of the benefits it provides. Instead, the government is demanding work to reciprocate one particular benefit it provides—a welfare check. Thus, for an individual to accept a welfare check and violate the work requirement, they would be flouting reciprocity in a narrow rather than a broad sense.

Throughout the chapter, Shelby appears to blur an important distinction between forced labor and work requirements for government benefits. He draws comparisons to "slavery, serfdom, colonial subjugation, and apartheid" (Shelby 196). Slavery is meaningfully different than work requirements for welfare since under slavery, you cannot escape your position. Shelby explains that the ghetto poor are exploited "insofar as [they] are forced to work because of a correctable, unjust basic structure" (196). I would argue that rather than being forced to work because of an unjust basic structure, the ghetto poor are forced to work as a fact of human nature. Work is not a peculiar condition of civil society. Instead, it is a perennial requirement for any person who wants to survive.

A government seems within its right to make welfare conditional on work because work is necessary to ensure primary goods, Additionally, since the obligation of reciprocity is unconditional, the ghetto poor seem obliged to work (at the very least to ensure their own survival). Because work is not unique to civil society, the requirement of working to live is not exploitative per se. Thus, the government is justified in requiring work as a condition of welfare, and those who violate this condition seem to transgress the demands of reciprocity.