Henry: Rawls and Conceptions of the Good

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I am puzzled by Rawls's conception of the good (or lack thereof) in A Theory of Justice.

Prior to completing this reading, I knew that Rawls's veil of ignorance prevented man from knowing "his place in society" (Rawls 11). I was not aware, however, that the veil of ignorance prevented men from knowing "their conceptions of the good" (11). This particular kind of ignorance seems to raise all sorts of problems for Rawls's original position. A man without a conception of the good seems hardly a man and hardly capable of engaging in the kind of deliberation that is necessary to come to an agreement about principles of justice. Nonetheless, Rawls wants to ensure that "persons’ conceptions of their good do not affect the principles adopted" (16-17). Is not our understanding of justice informed by our understanding of the good? Without a conception of the good, what basis do we have for deciding between certain principles?

Rawls tries to quell these fears by explaining that the parties in the original position are "rational and mutually disinterested" (12). Rawls defines "rational" in the instrumental sense popular among Hobbesians and economists alike, that is, "taking the most effective means to given ends" (12). Rawls recognizes certain "primary goods, that is, things that every rational man is presumed to want" (54). He identifies the "primary social goods" as "rights, liberties, and opportunities, and income and wealth" (79). Allan Bloom, in his "Review: Justice: John Rawls Vs. The Tradition of Political Philosophy," raises a keen objection to Rawls's attempt to outline primary goods: Rawls's primary goods are not universal across different conceptions of the good. As Bloom eloquently puts it, 

"What is wealth for him who believes that it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of heaven? What is health for him who believes with Pascal that sickness is the true state of the Christian? And how does the sense of one's own worth, rather than humility accord with the man who believes he is a sinner?" (Bloom 654).

Rawls admits that his theory of justice as fairness does not try to "evaluate the relative merits of different conceptions of the good" and instead assumes that "members of society are rational persons able to adjust their conceptions of the good to the situation" (Rawls 80-81). As Bloom writes, "[Rawls's] liberalism keeps him from excluding any preferences [and] his egalitarianism keeps him from saying that some goods are more reasonable or of a higher order than others" (Bloom 657). If Rawls does not evaluate the relative merit of certain conceptions of the good, what reasons would cause someone to make their conceptions "compatible with the principles of justice" (Rawls 81) as Rawls desires? Practically, once we move beyond the veil of ignorance and receive our conception of the good, what is to stop us from violating justice when it conflicts with our understanding of what is truly good? Rawls writes that "interests requiring the violation of justice have no value" (28). What basis does Rawls have for overriding a person's interests if, after all, the original position he bases his argument on is, by his own admission, "purely hypothetical" (19)?

Thus, I am deeply skeptical about the binding power of Rawls' political philosophy since it fails to recognize how fundamental people's conceptions of the good are to the foundation of a society.

Comments

  1. Noah HendelmanMarch 2, 2023 at 10:45 AM


    Hi Henry, thank you for your insightful blogpost. While I think your criticism raise very valid questions, I also think there are some compelling responses to the issues you raise, and I’m not as ready to dismiss the entire theory on behalf of your claims… don’t throw the baby out with the bathwater!

    As you correctly claim, Rawls does assumes “the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special psychological propensities” in the original position (11). However, I’m not sure my understanding of the way Rawls characterizes the good aligns with yours, and reaches your conclusion.

    Rawls claims that a group of people determining what is just and unjust is akin to “each person [deciding] by rational reflection what constitutes his good, that is, the system of ends which it is rational for him to pursue” (10-11). For Rawls, the good seems to be the endpoints which are rational for an individual to attain.

    From this conception, it seems evident members of the original position, not knowing “their conceptions of the good,” may more appropriately engage in deliberations of the principles of justice, because they do not know what ends to pursue for their life. They cannot craft biased principles of justice to advantage their own ends.

    You bring up thought-provoking questions on behalf of the role of good in determining justice: “Is not our understanding of justice informed by our understanding of the good? Without a conception of the good, what basis do we have for deciding between certain principles?”

    I think Rawls would agree that our personal sense of justice is informed by our notion of the good, but with a different connotation… for example, Lakers fans frequently interpret referee calls as just because they align with their notion of the good, or the Lakers winning. What we deem good inappropriately skews our understanding of just.

    Therefore, in order to create sound principles, we need to find goods remain ubiquitous among individuals, like the primary social goods you raise (rights, liberties, and opportunities, and income and wealth).

    But you take issue with Rawls not considering the relative merit of these principles, claiming that “if Rawls does not evaluate the relative merit of certain conceptions of the good, what reasons would cause someone to make their conceptions "compatible with the principles of justice” as Rawls desires?”

    I think that evaluating the relative merit of certain conceptions of the good is almost impossible: an opportunity to play baseball is likely worth less than sacrificing one’s income by 20 percent, but that income cut pales in comparison to the opportunity to grow up with two loving parents. The best we can do is throw general conceptions out and see how well they stick. In this sense, I don’t think the appropriate criteria for judging the theory of justice is to raise conflicting notions of good as undercutting the argument. Rather, we should look at the outcomes of distributing Rawls’s outlined primary social goods as the metric for judging the theory’s success. Rawls claims that “these goods normally have a use whatever a person’s rational plan for life,” making clear that occasionally the goods provide no use to individuals, but that does not negate the value of the distribution of the goods overall.

    Overall great post. I’m looking forward to discussing it more in class.

    ReplyDelete
  2. Henry LongMarch 2, 2023 at 11:48 AM

    Thanks for your comment, Noah. I thoroughly appreciate the criticism.

    As I mention in my blog post, if Rawls is defining reason as instrumental—that is, as "taking the most effective means to given ends" (12), how can he also invoke reason in a non-instrumental way and say that a person uses reason to "decide by rational reflection what constitutes his good" (10)? A man without a conception of the good reasoning about what would be good for him seems like a contradiction of terms.

    You also write that "in order to create sound principles, we need to find goods remain ubiquitous among individuals, like the primary social goods." As the Allan Bloom quote in my blog post pointed out, these primary social goods are by no means "ubiquitous among individuals."

    You also say that "evaluating the relative merit of certain conceptions of the good is almost impossible." Pardon the extremity of the example, but is it impossible, to say that Hitler's conception of the good was worse than Martin Luther King Jr.'s?

    The main issue I intend to raise is that for Rawls's theory of justice to be binding, it must provide some reason for people to limit their conception of the good in the real world. As I see it, men without a conception of the good seem sterile and bloodless.

    ReplyDelete

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