Kirby: Determination of The Good Life Amidst American Work Ethic Standards

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In Shelby's sixth chapter of Dark Ghettos, I was struck by his argument of self-determination for the ghetto poor's notion of fulfilling "work". Shelby argues that work can be understood in more contexts than in wage-based employment. This typical, narrow American mindset of what qualifies "work" is deeply rooted in unjust discrimination forms, especially with in the low-wage market on matters related to racial and gender discrimination. As an example, he notes the ignoring of the very intensive and crucial work of home care. Most women are expected to take on home duties, without pay or the respect of their efforts as legitimated occupations. In so many words, the efforts of marginalized people is reduced based on an element of identity within their "work". But Shelby argues that this assumption viewpoint neglects the distinction of a conscious refusal to contribute vs. a lack of motivation. Oftentimes, those marginalized are written off a lazy or unqualified through association of their identity (explicit or not). We seem to assume that the "U.S. liberal-capitalist order is basically just." (180)

But simply devoting oneself to wage-earning work does not make those efforts inherently good, Shelby writes. Take pornography or gambling: both spur monetary production, but are not definitively moral activities just because they are jobs. Shelby encourages us readers to consider that self-fulfillment via non wage-earning work can be just a valid and fulfilling (and more morally defendable) than common jobs. He writes: "Individuals should be free to develop and live according to their own vision of the good life, which may include a contested view about which kinds of activities or lives are meaningful and worthwhile, so long as they live up to their civic obligations.” (185) As such, "work" in a more flexible context here would mean freely chosen contributions, unbound by societal market impact. As Karl Marx would note here, authentic work towards private or public audience of a state only can be done when the actor freely, autonomously opts into that practice. Standards of earnings should not be the basis for a successful state.

Rather, the ability for each individual to select their own path of fulfillment and contribution as worthy would serve the political liberalism model. There is a crucial yet dismissed distinction within the US between "valuing work as a component of human flourishing and advocating for a political regime that forces people to work." (186) When citizens are given the structural means to determine what work is fulfilling or not, then reciprocity as a concept can take bloom. Specifically, the concept of fairness within reciprocity speaks to the golden rule: treat and put forth effort as much as the next person would. A goal to "change the incentive structure to encourage work in the licit economy," can largely be solved by stripping away to American notion of living to work, rather than working to live.

A brief question I hold in this dialogue: how do we properly define a collective "good life" when the centuries of past inequities and unjust discrimination have perhaps manipulated what is good for us? Does the current notion of those within Shelby's ghetto poor, in the determination of such a good life, actually lack the means of paving a freely chosen path? If people within this sector have never been exposed to alternative realities of those more well off, then how must we reconcile with their limited notion of the good life? Have we given them the proper stepping stones of exposure so that their choice of non-wage work can be made in full confidence? This is not to say that their viewpoint is dismissible. Rather, their perceptions may have been narrowed to a point of unfairness because they derive their desires from an unchosen, and yet still segregated standpoint.


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