Kirby: The Fallacy of "Natural" Endowments and Socialization Equity Measurement

Rawls’ justice as fairness theory is supported by two principles: the equal basic liberties principle and the difference principle. The difference principle can be divided into two demands pertaining to social and economic inequalities. One: “while the distribution of wealth and income need not be equal, it must be to everyone’s advantage,” and two: “positions of authority and offices of command must be accessible to all.” (61) There is a priority of one element over the other. Rawls argues that “a departure from the institutions of equal liberty required by the first principle cannot be justified by, or compensated for, by the greater social and economic advantages.” (61) Aggregate prioritization is as follows: the first principle (equal access to basic liberties) > the second principle in sum (opportunity equality, social and economic equality). Within the second principle, equality of opportunity eclipses the priority of social and economic equality. So, if there were inequalities in, say, education amidst Rawls’ just liberal society, the opportunity to pursue education to its most desired extent must subsist. 

On education, Rawls writes that in his theoretical society, we should assume that “there is a fair equality of opportunity underwritten by education for all.” (87) This assumption is predicated on the necessity to “set up and to administer impartially a just system of institutions.” (86) Rawls relates this vague notion of procedural justice successfully transferring into institutions of distributive justice through an example of poker. When all players at the table have participated in a fair game, then the final earning distribution is fair, “or at least not unfair.” (86) Because player X obeyed the rules as much as play Z did (the dealer abiding as well), then none can claim they were victim to an impartial system. X and Z each had access to an opportunity to win. But what would Rawls say here if player Z had a socialization advantage? Say player Z grew up in a family of poker fanatics–she was conditioned to the game from a young age; thus, she retained a sense of comfort, experience, and knowledge that X was never privy to. Likewise (though a more crucial question than poker mobility, unless you're David Negreanu) how would Rawls respond to a college application socialization advantage? 

A student, J, was raised in a home of intensive professors, who exposed her to advanced academic inquiry, developed her composition virtuosity, and trained her in testing strategy. Another student, P, was not brought up in such a setting, yet both J and P obtain the same college counselor, access to a need-blind admission program, and other criteria that equalizes their applicant opportunity. As such, opportunity equality is present. However, as with the poker scenario, one actor has a socialization advantage. Rawls writes that, “chances to acquire cultural knowledge and skills should not depend on one’s class position,” because “in all sectors of [Rawls’ version of] society there should be roughly equal prospects of culture and achievement for everyone similarly motivated and endowed.” (73) In this just liberal society, students P/J, and players X/Z, do not experience socialization differences in poker or academia as result of class differences. 

But for the line between natural talent and class-based talent, Rawls has seemingly no remedy for. Even if the poker table and the classroom are settings in which, under the justice as fairness theory, “should be designed to even out class barriers,” the layers of legacy-based wealth do not disappear. (73) Some talents can be furthered through income, such as singing lessons. But Rawls knows this: he writes that, “the principle of fair opportunity can be only imperfectly carried out, at least as long as the institution of the family exists.” (74)  It seems as though Rawls can’t identify a remedy: natural abilities can be enhanced/trained/stretched for benefit, as long as wealth and income differences exist. No simple culture equality can cure this. The “natural” endowment of talent will be manipulated to situate the talented, advantaged folks into another bracket than the disadvantaged and talented. Rawls even admits “it is impossible in practice to secure equal chances of achievement and culture for those similarly endowed.” (74) I would argue that similar endowment will always be based on class. Even if all have opportunity equality, those “similarly motivated and endowed” find such similarity not because they were all gifted at birth, or because they all have equal exposure to cultural content, but because their “natural” endowments are result of ancestral socialization access. This notion of the “natural lottery” troubles me – Rawls seems to ignore that socialization inequities have a direct impact on opportunities, and socialization draws from class impact.