Livia: Nozick on Patterned Principles of Distributive Property
When Nozick discusses patterned principles of
distributive property, he demonstrates how these principles would often involve
“head-on clashes between the moral side constraints on how individuals may be treated
and their patterned conception of justice that presents an end state” (172). To
demonstrate these conflicts, Nozick invites us to consider a thought experiment
in which a society has a compulsory scheme of minimal social provision to aid
the neediest. He suggests that emigration is allowed for individuals within
this society. Further, he articulates that anyone who decides to leave would be
doing so to avoid this mandatory participation in social provision. He asks the
powerful question “What rationale yields the result the person be permitted to
emigrate, yet forbidden to stay and opt our of the compulsory provision?” (173)
While Nozick does not aim to fully answer his own question, he concludes that potentially,
the logical contradiction in this society’s claim comes from the rationale that
forcing aid tends to produce fraternal feelings between the aided and the aider.
As I read this though experiment, it made me consider
the supreme court case National Federation of Independent Business v
Sebelius. This case (put simply) considered the constitutionality of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) which became effective on March
23, 2010. The most critical aspect of this act was the minimum coverage provision
which provided an individual mandate forcing all individuals to purchase and
maintain a minimum level of health insurance. If individuals failed to comply
with this requirement, individuals had to pay a tax penalty. While the question
concerning Congress’s use of the commerce clause to legitimize this act is important
here, I will set this question aside for now. The relevant question for this
blog post is: Can the government compel individuals to become active in
commerce? Here, we see a similar question to that of Nozick’s thought
experiment above. There is some level of compulsion at a governmental level
that seems questionable here. While answering the question I proposed above might
seem simple quite simply: the government should not have the power to do so,
the question becomes complicated when one considers the ramifications of a
failure to participate on the whole of society. In this instance, the failure
of individuals to buy and maintain health insurances places a tremendous burden
upon those who do have health insurance to cover their expenses. Why might it
be ok for individuals to not pay for insurance and force other individuals who
do pay for insurance to cover them? Why is not ok for these individuals to be
forced to pay for insurance such that this burden is not imposed upon others?
It seems morally irreconcilable.
Surprisingly, I find myself agreeing with Nozcik here.
There does appear to be this tension created when we appeal to patterned
principles of distributive property. Thought, I would like to dig a bit deeper
into understanding how Nozick believes his notion of distributive justice
rectifies these issues.
Comments
Post a Comment