Noah: Nozick and Taxation as Forced Labor
One of most the striking parts of Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia was the way it treated material versus nonmaterial consumption in making a point about illegitimate taxation.
Nozick claims that a progressive taxation system, which taxes earnings above the amount needed for basic needs, is unjust and on par with forced labor. He paints a very dark picture around the decision to either live at the line of having one’s basic needs met, or supporting Uncle Sam through taxes, claiming “the fact that others intentionally intervene… to threaten force to limit the alternatives, in this case to paying taxes or bare subsistence, makes the taxation system one of forced labor and distinguishes it from other cases of limited choices which are not forcings” (169). To Nozick, the option of earning without being taxed is the only just option because patterned principles of distributive justice (like taxation) involve appropriating the actions of other persons. The taxation on work that generates wealth past one’s basic needs is akin to forced labor because the same constriction would not exist for someone choosing leisure instead of work.
Upon reading this, my first thought was that as long as one’s decision between leisure and benefit from working takes into account his respective tax bracket—as in the value of working is lessened by whatever percentage tax is applicable—the dichotomy can in no way be characterized as forced labor. Rawls’s response makes the same point: “Because these adjustments [of calculating taxation] are foreseen, they have already been taken into account when rational citizens draw up their plans in the first place. Citizens understand that when they take part in social cooperation, their property and wealth, and their share of what they help to produce, are subject to the adjustments which the background institutions” (38).
Nevertheless, Nozick moves on to make the point that if time used to work and earn money provides the same benefit as time spent through leisure, and forcing someone to support the needy through their leisure is illegitimate, how can forcing someone to pay taxes be legitimate? In other words, “why is the person with the nonmaterial desire allowed to proceed unimpeded… whereas the man whose pleasures or desires involve material things and who must work for extra money is constrained in what he can realize?” (170).
While I think calculating taxes into the leisure vs work equation still solves this problem, there are some other responses I would like to explore. One could argue that just like there are material constrains for one’s income on behalf of the public good, there are also leisure constraints that are mandated and generally regarded as responsible. We don’t let kids drink alcohol (as I’m sure all of us under 21 unquestionably observe) because a certain level of maturity is appropriate in order for individuals to responsibly behave while intoxicated. We close public parks during the night for public safety. Nonmaterial desire is not always allowed to proceed unimpeded, and leisure is often appropriately restricted in order to support a better society in the same way that taxation does.
Moreover, I would argue that the constraint of taxes on a man whose pleasures involve material is absolutely negligent compared to constraints of poor environment, inheritance, or genetic lottery. I think the Wilt Chamberlin example actually proves my point. While Nozick uses Chamberlin to demonstrate how unequal holdings stemming from just arrangements and origins are just, I see another side of the story. Chamberlin’s height (7′ 1″) was an essential component to his material success. A 5’ 8’’ Chamberlin, even with his work ethic and athleticism, would almost certainly not have made it to the NBA. In this case, a taxation rate nearing 100% would need to be implemented to equal the arbitrary genetic lottery that Chamberlin won. If one is to agree with Rawls “that no one deserves (in the sense of moral desert) their place in the distribution of native endowments,” and Chamberlin’s success rested on one of his native endowments, how can he justify keeping all the profits because he won the genetic lottery. A tax on his riches seems like a small constraint compared to the 85% of men under 6ft who lost the genetic lottery with respect to NBA aspirations. I would ask Nozick how a constraint of taxation can be unjust when undeserving qualities often remain more constricting to one’s material outcome.
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