Ripstein's Channeling of Kantian Ideals: Discussion of Homelessness

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Ripstein's channeling of Kantian ideals is the basis of his argument for state coercion in the form of public roads. Unlike most other liberal approaches, which rely on balancing the benefits and costs of social cooperation, Kant's system relies on the notion of individual freedom. Regardless of whether the benefits and costs are fairly distributed, if individual freedom is compromised to any extent, society cannot be deemed just. In Kantian theory, individual freedom stands if each person in society acts as his own master: "no private master can be compelled to serve the private purposes of another" (242). In other words, one has individual freedom when he is not used as the means to ends that he has not consented to. 

It might be useful to illustrate this idea with two contrasting hypothetical examples here. Let us suppose that in the first case, Professor Hurley opens a jewelry store immediately next to Ella's jewelry store. While Professor Hurley might make Ella worse off, by selling similar pieces of jewelry at cheaper prices, he does not interfere with Ella's individual freedom. We can sympathize with Ella, who is now at a higher risk of losing business, but we cannot say that Ella has experienced an injustice. After all, she is still her own master and is still able to use her own means to achieve her own ends. 

Let us then suppose that in the second case, Professor Hurley opens a jewelry store immediately next to Ella's store and attempts to discredit Ella's store by releasing rats into it, causing her to fail the next public inspection. In this case, we can say that Ella has experienced an injustice because Professor Hurley has interfered in Ella's pursuit of her ends. In Kantian terms, Ella's individual freedom has been constrained by Professor Hurley's actions. The notion of individual freedom illustrated by these two hypothetical examples is key to Kant's account as it is an "innate right...belonging to every human being by virtue of his humanity" (13). 

More importantly, as long as societal relations abide by this notion of individual freedom, the state's coercion (in this case, establishing public roads and enforcing rules for these roads) is completely justified. It is at this point in his channeling of Kantian ideas that Ripstein describes the case of public roads and rules. According to Ripstein, in a libertarian society in which "all land is privately held" (244), problems arise because individuals' rights to associate with others and to travel become constrained by people's entitlement to "determine what happens on his or her piece of land" (244). In such a society, one needs the permission of his neighbors to cross their land, which he almost always needs to do to be moveable. Ripstein argues that public roads are an important part of a rightful condition because they are necessary for upholding individual freedom: "Roads...guarantee that there is a path from every piece of privately held land to every other" (248). Roads enable individuals to enter into voluntary transactions without having their individual freedom compromised. 

As Professor Hurley mentioned in his email, like the conception of private land (and the inability to traverse across others' private land) in a libertarian society, homelessness violates the preconditions of equal individual freedom. Following Ripstein's account, homelessness embodies such a violation in that it is conducive to direct dependence on others. Those who become subject to the perils of homelessness are unable to act as their own masters. Because of this, the state must fulfill its obligation of ensuring that all individuals have individual freedom. This justifies state intervention in the form of the creation/maintenance of certain institutions and the provision of public goods, both of which must protect the independence of all individuals, including homeless individuals. 


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