Sambhav: Capabilities vs. Preference Satisfaction

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Amartya Sen's capability approach, elucidated in Development as Freedom posits that human welfare and development are contingent upon expanding individuals' capabilities. However, the intrinsic value of capabilities is debatable; one might argue that preference satisfaction is more crucial to human welfare.

 Sen defines development as "a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy" (Sen, 1999, p. 3), emphasizing that enhancing capabilities allows individuals to choose the lives they desire. Nevertheless, the idea that capabilities matter intrinsically raises questions. The true essence of human welfare may not lie in the mere ability to satisfy preferences, but rather in the actual satisfaction of those preferences.  For instance, consider two individuals with identical capabilities: one actively utilizes these capabilities to satisfy their preferences, while the other does not. According to the capability approach, both individuals would have similar levels of welfare. However, the latter's unfulfilled preferences suggest that their welfare might be lower. Focusing on preference satisfaction rather than capabilities could provide a more accurate measure of human welfare. Moreover, it prompts us to examine the reasons behind unfulfilled preferences and devise interventions to address them. Subjective well-being (SWB) data from longitudinal studies can help us identify which capabilities have the most impact on people's lives (which increase freedoms to the most significant degree, as Sen would say), and design interventions that most effectively increase them.

Sen acknowledges that valuable capabilities can vary between different societies and can also change over time. Yet, this lack of specificity can lead to the inefficient allocation of resources when pursuing development goals. Concentrating on preference satisfaction could necessitate identifying the most consequential preferences to satisfy, thereby optimizing resource allocation and enhancing overall human welfare.

Comments

  1. GioMarch 30, 2023 at 1:07 AM

    Sambhav, I am pretty confused by what your point is here. Putting Sen's critique of Utilitarianism (which I assume is what you are appealing to when you speak of preference satisfaction) aside, I don't see how you are critiquing the intrinsic value of capabilities. Is the core function of humans the ability to think and choose for themselves? Should we not be maximizing people's ability to set ends for themselves and their having the means to achieve those ends should they want to? Does the capabilities framework achieve this? Or does it not, at least, achieve this better than pure preference satisfaction? In the example you provide, both agents have identical preferences and identical capabilities to satisfy these preferences. They and their situations are completely identical except that one chooses to satisfy this preference while the other doesn't. Whether they choose to satisfy their preference is none of our business. As long they have they ability to set their preferences and achieve their preferences is what we should be concerned with. Whether they choose to satisfy these preferences (for whatever reason) is their business; after all, they are free beings.

    Likewise, I do not see what you're getting at in your final paragraph.

    In short, I am confused as to what your point is. Maybe I am understanding you incorrectly.

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  2. Paul HurleyMarch 30, 2023 at 10:12 AM

    There are important questions about the relationship between capabilities and functionings raised by your post. Notice, though, that on most understandings of "welfare," e.g. as preference satisfaction or as well-being, the capabilities approach does not claim, as you suggest, that the two people in your example would have similar levels of welfare. Isn't part of Sen's point that welfare levels, rather than levels of freedom/capability, is the right metric to be used? The worry is that framing the issue in terms of welfare begs the question against the capabilities account, which is rejecting welfare as the relevant metric for development.

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