Anderson on Workplace Democracy

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 My post will be fairly short as it is just a clarifying question. In her response to Tyler Cowen, Anderson states that we should "let workers speak for themselves in the context of a system of workplace governance in which they have a voice" (Anderson 143). I am curious as to what that would look like. Anderson writes about labor unions in chapter 2 of Private Government, and while I like labor unions because they shift the balance of bargaining power in the direction of the workers, I am afraid that they are just that: a tool to help workers get more favorable outcomes out of transactions within the firm. Ultimately, that still relies on a market within the firm to uphold workers' rights, and I don't know if that is a safe bet. 

Additionally, unions only work when the employer themself allows them, so how do we ensure that people who want to unionize can in the first place? I am also curious as to what role Anderson believes the state can have in securing workers' rights. I agree with her when she points out that a workers' bill of rights "can at best offer a minimal floor" since "they prescribe uniformity across workplaces." What then, can/should the state do to protect workers? I wonder what Anderson would think of Tommie Shelby's argument that work should not be a necessary precondition for receiving welfare benefits when the alternative would be entering into an unjust labor market. A policy of this kind, like a universal basic income, would help with the "exit" strategy of Anderson's four strategies for advancing the freedom of the governed, but it is also just a market solution. 

For me, workplace democracy seems like the best way to secure the rights for the least advantaged members of a firm. I don't mean workplace democracy in the sense that workers have direct control over every decision being made, but rather that they get to choose their managers from themselves. That way, managers are held accountable, and any authority they would use would be legitimately possessed since they acquired that authority through a democratic process and not through a quasi-egalitarian labor contract. I believe that this is quite close to the German codetermination model that Anderson and Cowen both mention, but Anderson hesitates to fully endorse that model.

In short, I loved Anderson's historical account of markets and the modern American workplace, and I loved even more her response to Cowen, and I would like to know what she believes is the best method (external to the firm, within the firm, or a combination of both) to secure workers' freedoms.

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