Brad: Táíwò's Constructive View of Reparations

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In his Reconsidering Reparations, Olúfẹ́mi O. Táíwò offers a global, progressive approach to reparations. As Henry pointed out in his blog post, Táíwò offers a historical account that emphasizes the fundamental role that trans-Atlantic slavery and colonialism played in the development of the "global racial empire" (32). Táíwò also appeals to the notions of cumulative advantage and disadvantage to describe the nature of the relations between the oppressors and oppressed. 

A significant aspect of Táíwò's argument is its recognition of the global scale of the system of cumulative advantage and disadvantage. He states: "At a global scale, these forces shift advantages across countries and continents, toward the so Global North. Disadvantages are shunted toward the developing nations, the Global South" (33). This is not to say, however, that the same system does not have implications at a lower, national scale. Táíwò argues that a nearly identical motion of cumulative advantage and disadvantage can be observed in the relations between "people racialized as white...and those racialized as black" (33). By emphasizing the inequalities that result from these global and national dynamics, Táíwò is able to demonstrate that the task at hand is urgent and global: "If slavery and colonialism built the world and its current basic scheme of social injustice, the proper task of social justice is no smaller: it is, quite literally, to remake the world" (67). 

In his blog post, Henry argues that Táíwò's argument does not satisfy the necessary conditions for international social justice under the political conception of justice. While I agree that Táíwò's argument does not satisfy these particular conditions, I doubt whether the political conception of justice is even (or should be) a point of concern to Táíwò. In following his political conception of justice, Nagel argues that the "heightened standards of equal treatment in principles of justice" (Nagel 130) only arise in the context of a state and not of all states. Táíwò's emphasis on trans-Atlantic slavery and colonialism and the perpetuation of injustices that occurs on a global scale suggests that the distinction between rights in the context of the state and those in the context of the globe is irrelevant. To Táíwò, reparations must involve structural change and aim to construct a more just world. 

Another significant aspect of Táíwò's argument--and one that makes it particularly compelling--is its focus on the past and future. He argues that this makes his constructive view distinct from other rationalizations of reparations. As seen through his outline of global history and derived conclusions, Táíwò uses a yesterday-today-tomorrow lens. This enables him to point to problems of inequality that we can see today (e.g. exploitation of black tenants, implementation of Western-centric banking policies, etc.), identify the institutions and ideologies that gave rise to these problems, and propose holistic solutions that would not only address these problems but also contribute to the "just world" he envisions. 

I am interested in exploring Táíwò's proposed implementation of his account about reparations. As he stated, his intention in providing this account is to remake the world. If he has provided sufficient justification for reconstructing the world--and I argue that he does--how would reparations fit into his approach? Given that reparations for trans-Atlantic slavery and colonialism would require so much, how would we ensure that the reparations that are given are enough? 

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