Henry: Freedom & Power

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Marianne Hill and Raka Ray's works explore the interplay between freedom and power. Both authors demonstrate how the existing power structure can constrain the exercise of freedom.

Hill explains that according to Sen, "freedom does not place demands on people to try to help others" although Sen observes that "there may sometimes be a good case for suggesting – or demanding – that others help the person to achieve the freedom in question" (Hill 122). Because Sen's capabilities model does not make demands upon those in power, Hill must therefore outline "a view of social power and its exercise that is congruent with the capability approach" (Hill 117).

Hill explains that according to Philip Pettit, Sen's substantive freedoms require "the absence of a power of arbitrary interference on the part of others: the absence of domination" (Hill 120). Thus, for substantive freedoms to be achieved, power must be effectively democratized (Hill 121). Hill explains that the democratization process is not easy and often "requires changing practices that are deeply embedded in institutions such as the family, the firm, and the state" (Hill 123). Hill says that because these institutions are "deeply embedded," they are quite difficult to change (Hill 126).

Hill explains that the burdens of democratization typically fall on the oppressed since they have a "strong stake in a redistribution of social power" (Hill 123). According to Hill, those in power are often ambivalent if not resistant to democratization because "improvement in the substantive freedoms of a group through increased democracy is likely to reduce some of the attainable capabilities of many of those losing power" (Hill 129). As a result, Hill asserts that "meaningful changes in the distribution of power often meet with strong resistance" (Hill 130).

Given the difficulty of overcoming entrenched power structures, Hill and Ray provide playbooks for those invested in promoting freedom through the democratization of power. Both Hill and Ray explain that power is about more than just access to resources and the ability to use force. For them, power is about the ability to persuade others by appealing to shared values (Hill 128, Ray 10). Hill holds that "an individual’s values will affect her or his reaction to the possibility of a new, democratizing social practice" (Hill 125). As a result, Hill advises that "innovators can foster the development of liberating knowledge and practices by building systematically upon positive impulses" (Hill 129). 

Ray explains that the tactics used by groups must be heavily dependent on the context in which power is exercised. Ray specifically appeals to the political culture and distribution of power as contextually relevant aspects of how power is exercised (Ray 7). For example, Ray explains that a political context with a concentration of power and a homogenous political culture is hegemonic (Ray 10). Ray holds that "a social movement organization confronting a hegemonic political culture has less freedom and must find some way of working with the dominant discourse" (Ray 9). Thus, the existing power structure constrains peoples' ability to effectively advocate for change. 

Thus, while Hill's analysis shows that those interested in freedom must democratize the existing power structure, Ray's analysis demonstrates that to do so, people must operate effectively within the existing power structure.

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