Henry: Táíwò and the Political Conception of Justice

Olúfẹ́mi O. Táíwò's argument in Reconsidering Reparations provides a compelling rejoinder to Thomas Nagel's argument in "The Problem of Global Justice." That said, I do not think that Táíwò's argument adequately establishes that we have an international obligation of social justice under the political conception of justice.

According to Nagel, "some would argue that world economic interdependence already brings into force a version of the political conception of justice, so that Rawls' principles, to some alternative principles of distributive justice, are applicable over the domain covered by the existing cooperative institutions" (Nagel 137). This view—along with more philosophical argumentation and historical context—is Táíwò's perspective. Nagel rejects this perspective since, according to him, "mere economic interaction does not trigger the heightened standards of socioeconomic justice" (Nagel 138). Nagel argues that our current set of international institutions "do not ask for the kind of authorization by individuals that carries with it a responsibility to treat all those individuals in some sense equally" (Nagel 138).

Nagel explains why he thinks that our current state of affairs is not one that activates considerations of distributive justice. As Nagel writes, "justice applies... only to a form of organization that claims political legitimacy and the right to impose decisions by force, and not to a voluntary association or contract among independent parties concerned to advance their common interests" (Nagel 140). According to Nagel, "there is a big difference agreements or consensus among separate states committed to the advancement of their own interests and a binding procedure, based on some kind of collective authority, charged with securing the common good" (Nagel 145). Nagel believes that the current state of affairs does not meet the standards necessary to justify claims to international social justice.

Táíwò's argument adds more nuance to the picture. Táíwò rightly demonstrates how the international order is not simply a "voluntary association" where each state is "committed to the advancement of their own interests." In fact, Táíwò points out how the international order involves a great deal of coercion and leveraging of power. Táíwò explains that "trans-Atlantic slavery and colonialism" generated a "global racial empire," understood "as a system of distribution" for advantages and disadvantages" (Táíwò 10). Táíwò compares this to a network of aqueducts (Táíwò 20). Táíwò derives much of his argument from Charles Mills's book The Racial Contract. Similar to Táíwò's global racial empire, Mills refers to "global white supremacy" (Táíwò 24), which he defines as "a particular power structure of formal or informal rule, socioeconomic privilege, and norms for the differential distribution of material wealth and opportunities, benefits and burdens, rights and duties" (Táíwò 25). Táíwò clarifies that this power need not be expressly political, explaining that "the categories we frequently use to describe power—social, economic, political, military, ideological—can obfuscate the general unity of the Global Racial Empire" (Táíwò 65). Thus, Táíwò concludes that "if slavery and colonialism built the world and its current basic scheme of social injustice, the proper task of social justice is no smaller: it is, quite literally, to remake the world" (Táíwò 67). 

Táíwò discusses the practices of slavery and colonialism in the transatlantic world and their role in building a global racial empire. While these powers were colonial powers, they certainly used coercive power and made claims of political legitimacy. As Táíwò writes, "colonial governments wielded broadly autocratic and repressive powers" (Táíwò 55). But Táíwò acknowledges that we are in a new stage—neocolonialism. Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana’s first Prime Minister, defines "neocolonialism" as a global order in which ex-colonizers have "power without responsibility" and ex-colonies have "exploitation without redress" (Táíwò 56). As Táíwò describes it, "the current relations between post-colonial nations and their former imperial centers show that the currents of material and power keep flowing in the same directions" (Táíwò 60). 

From the perspective of Nagel's political conception of justice, I do not think that Táíwò's successfully proves the existence of the necessary conditions for international social justice. As Nagel points out, social justice claims require what he calls "a form of organization that claims political legitimacy and the right to impose decisions by force" (Nagel 140). The mere leveraging of power of the kind Táíwò describes does not necessarily imply a claim to political legitimacy. Barring the cases of "'active violence' to maintain the system" (Táíwò 60)—which are doubtless many and not to be ignored—the current state of affairs does not meet the necessary conditions for the political conception of justice to demand social justice because there is currently no claim to political legitimacy through a collective authority. The existence of "power without responsibility" may just be an unfortunate byproduct of the political conception of justice.

Consider a parallel case on the state level: Let's say that on Monday, Professor Hurley creates a state composed of our PPE class and then uses his power to unjustly seize all of Brad's money. Under the political conception of justice, Brad has a legitimate claim on Professor Hurley to return the money. But then on Tuesday, let's say that Professor Hurley dissolves the PPE government and we return to the Hobesian war of all against all. While Brad has a legitimate claim on Professor Hurley on Monday, he does not have a legitimate claim on Professor Hurley on Tuesday under the political conception of justice—even if Professor Hurley makes him do the a demeaning dance like the Macarena to get his money back. One might argue that this is a weakness of the political conception of justice, and one might be right to do so. But I do not think the political conception of justice on its own provides the resources to say that the conditions of social justice apply to Professor Hurley on Tuesday.

Táíwò starts his book with a syllogism: "injustice and oppression are global in scale. Why? Because Trans-Atlantic slavery and colonialism built the world we live in, and slavery and colonialism were unjust and oppressive" (Táíwò 1). Here it is in standard form:

1. If Trans-Atlantic slavery and colonialism built the world we live in, and Trans-Atlantic slavery and colonialism were unjust and oppressive, then injustice and oppression are global in scale.
2. Trans-Atlantic slavery and colonialism built the world we live in.
3. Trans-Atlantic slavery and colonialism were unjust and oppressive.
4. Therefore, injustice and oppression are global in scale.

In this blog post, I raised a challenge to the first premise, arguing that even though Trans-Atlantic slavery and colonialism were socially unjust given the conditions under which they were established, there is no current social framework by which we might call their lasting effects socially unjust—at least under the political conception of justice.