Noah: Hill and Shelby

In reading Marianne Hill’s Development as Empowerment, I found many of her arguments similar to ones in  Shelby’s Dark Ghettos. For context, Shelby is primarily concerned with establishing the United States as fundamentally unjust in its treatment of the ghetto poor and therefore undeserving of their civic obligation. His account has several parallels with Hill’s that I wanted to explore, including the ramification of Hill’s democratization approach in starting to rectify our enormous debt ghetto communities.

Hill speaks about individuals who have a discrepancy between their articulated and true needs: the factory worker who labors in unsafe working conditions but lacks the “institutional channels that could enable the articulation and recognition of their needs” (121). Unlike these individuals, the ghetto poor largely recognize their true interests within a capabilities approach—like financial security, quality education, racial equality—but they similarly lack the institutional channels which would enable a broader society to recognize or assist in making a reality of them. Therefore, I see potential in Hill’s argument to aid enormous task of rectifying conditions within ghetto communities.

Hill’s proposed solution to this problem, Democratization, “refers to increasing participation in all spheres of social life, not only in the articulation of needs, but also in their recognition by society” (122). There is a dual motive of empowering individuals to overcome their negative conditioning, and simultaneously obliging societies to accommodate (or at least acknowledge) the perspectives of marginalized individuals. This is quite a tall task, as “the recognition and articulation of the true interests of those who are subordinate… requires changing practices that are deeply embedded in institutions such as the family, the firm, or the state” (123). Shelby argues along similar lines, claiming that recognizing the ghetto poor’s true interests means changing the way we view institutions like crime and punishment. Because there is an expectation of reciprocity underlying the core duty of civic obligation, when the ghetto poor endure conditions like unnecessary impoverishment or marginal economic opportunity, they become relinquished from their civic obligations. 

Hill also outlines how this process of rethinking institutions within democratization leads to grievances from the dominant groups: “those in positions of authority… will likely believe that gains [of underrepresented voices] have failed to offset their loss of power unless their values change considerable during the process” (129). Within a Dark Ghettos context, Shelby makes a similar point when stating how whites were largely unwilling to implement bussing to integrate black children into white schools because they saw it as a “threat to their own schools and neighborhood” (75). For Shelby, the attitudes and values of whites are still largely incompatible with seamless integration of black community members. The prospect of aiding the ghetto poor is especially challenging because the dominant values do not consider it a priority. In addition, we have seen small but crucial victories for black communities—within fields like police and criminal justice reform—have been often met with white anxiety because of a perceived loss in power.

On a personal note, upon first reading Shelby’s argument, I found it a touch pill to swallow: not everyone who lives within the U.S. should be required to follow the law. Mill offers an explanation for my reluctance, claiming that when “value systems come in conflict… such cognitive dissonance offers the possibility for individuals to create new behavior patterns… what they usually choose, however, is the resolution of individual dilemmas in favor of accepted social rules” (125). When my value systems (of racial equality and legal authority) came into conflict, the knee jerk reaction was to side with the status quo: no one should have a right to act unlawfully. Conflicting value systems of the oppressed and the oppressors are generally solved with favor to the oppressor. Democratization is crucial to implement because it offers a greater microphone to the oppressed, involving “the creation of new knowledge and values… that brings about the meaningful empowerment of groups related to subordinate positions” (123). If the U.S. were to take seriously this proposition for ghetto communities, it would need to address issues like employment opportunity, affordable housing, incarceration reform, education systems, or racial stereotyping with recognition that competing value systems (like economic interest in property values or inhabiting a similarly cultured community) will shift opinions to the status quo, making change harder. 

Finally, the most powerful element of democratization is “rival interpretations of truths regarding the group that is contesting its subordinate position will emerge, interpretations that society must evaluate and weigh” (127). Let’ say that within the debate around ghetto emancipation, there only exists Shelby’s argument and the status quo: a bootstraps mentality. Perhaps Shelby’s notion of individuals being held to different legal standards is too extreme for the current society. Still, the conditions of concentrated disadvantage in ghetto communities are required to be wrestled with. Through this push and pull, new notions of truth are spread and new understanding is reached. The evaluating and weighing of groups in subordinate positions provides a strong foundation to begin rectifying our debt to ghetto communities. Democratization, when viewed from the obligations of society towards oppressed individuals, seems to reinforce Shelby's arguments and additionally offer key insights on how to reform our approach to community building in ghettos.