Sambhav: Freedoms – But to what extent, though?

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As a response to Anderson, Economist Tyler Cowen makes some compelling arguments on why “Anderson’s portrait is too negative towards business and too unwilling to confront the relevant trade-offs square on.” (Cowen, 116) However, Anderson tries to counterargue by claiming that “market outcomes thereby grossly undervalue the costs to workers of private government.” (Anderson, 138) She makes all sorts of empirical and theoretical claims about how the “staggering scale of wage theft,” (Anderson, 140) the existence of sexual harassment in all industries, the dubious productivity effects of codetermination, and the lack of voice in economic modeling all point towards the need for“some kind of institutionalized voice at work.” (Anderson, 143) However, I argue that the extent to which autonomy, dignity, or any other freedoms are defined plays a crucial role in determining how unjust an employer-employee relationship really is.

The way we define autonomy, dignity, and other freedoms has a significant impact on our understanding of the justness of employer-employee relationships. Different interpretations of these concepts can lead to varying conclusions about the legitimacy of authority within the workplace. For instance, a broad understanding of autonomy might entail that individuals have complete control over their actions, while a narrower understanding may accept certain limitations imposed by employers as long as employees maintain a degree of decision-making power.

In the same vein, the concept of dignity can be interpreted in multiple ways. A more lenient interpretation might argue that as long as employees are treated with basic respect and their rights are not blatantly violated, a job can be considered just. In contrast, a stricter understanding of dignity may require that employees have a significant level of voice in workplace decision-making to ensure their well-being and self-worth are fully acknowledged.

To illustrate how different interpretations of autonomy and dignity (or other freedoms) can lead to contrasting views on the justness of workplace relationships, let's consider two hypothetical scenarios: an employee working at Goldman Sachs and another at your stereotypical non-profit organization (low-pay, great work-life balance, etc.). In the case of the Goldman Sachs employee, they might enjoy a high salary, which could be viewed as granting them a certain level of autonomy, but their voice in decision-making might be limited due to the hierarchical nature of the company. On the other hand, the non-profit employee may have a lower salary and hence lower “autonomy”, but their voice may be more valued and influential within the organization's decision-making processes. On some views, the Goldman Sachs job probably passes the baseline autonomy and dignity test (without considering wages) and on some, it probably doesn't.

Depending on one's understanding of autonomy, dignity, and overall freedom, both workplaces could be considered just or unjust. We have to determine, both if higher pay is an essential component of freedom (which you cannot just shun as “marginal utility” (143)) and how and to what extent baseline or acceptable freedom is defined.

Tangentially, I have a general concern with Anderson’s line of reasoning w.r.t pursuing a certain conception of freedom (and to a certain extent, whatever that is), while claiming that people's decisions “do not account for all their concerns and that they still retain an interest in having a say over their working conditions.” (Anderson, 139) As Sen would argue, we should focus on the actual capability of persons to achieve lives they value (or to figure out what lives they value as a prior) rather than to push a conception of a valuable and good life to them. This could mean improving employees’ exit options, their intersectoral and intrasectoral mobility, and the extent to which markets are efficient and react to incentives (structurally speaking). I would extend Sen’s argument further by saying that we should emphasize the actualization of these subjectively valuable lives. There is a bleak possibility that maybe what people are looking to optimize from their work/life experience is “dignity, autonomy, and a standing no less than that of their employers,” (Anderson,144) but I seriously doubt that.

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