Tara's Reconstruction of Privacy

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 I am still working through Tara's Thesis, and I'm very much enjoying it so far. Attempting to completely restructure our understanding of privacy and its importance is an extremely difficult task, and Tara has produced a commendable effort. The following are some lingering thoughts and questions I have after reading chapter 1:


I have two main questions: 1) What exactly is the sphere of personal space and what is included in it? and 2) Can we truly find a right to privacy in the text of the Constitution?


Tara derives here idea of personal space from the Lockean idea of a fence of freedom which others can't interfere with, and whose contents we have total control over. This raises a question that I had about Tara's explanation about the distinction between personal and private property. Is the difference only that someone serves to gain a "social status" when using private property? In the gem example, if the owner never intends to use them for money or as a status symbol, are they considered personal and not private property? Aside from this distinction, I understand, practically, why our ideas and conversations are included in this personal space because by virtue of an unwanted person knowing of these ideas or conversations, we automatically lose control and exclusivity over them. I don't think, however, that this inherently extends to the gems example. The gems are something that the owner has control over. After the intruder finds the gems, records their existence, and informs others, they still have the gems, and they can use the gems however they wish. The promulgation of the knowledge of the gems' existence (no matter how wide) doesn't diminish the owner's control over the gems. Sure, their safety may be threatened since people know they have the gems, but the owner still has the right and ability to do whatever they want with the gems and to restrict anyone they want from accessing them (except in the case of a legal search and seizure). I think the reason why we see the gems example as a violation of privacy is not because of the gems themselves, but because they were hidden in the owner's house. Because you have a right to your house, you have a right to its contents and whether those contents are brought into the public sphere of knowledge. Likewise, if you have rightful ownership of a box, and you are using the box to conceal its contents, you cannot be forced to show people what is inside the box outside of extraordinary circumstances because that would defeat the purpose of the box; that person is being prevented by others to use their "means,"in this case the box, to pursue their "end," in this case, hiding whatever is inside it (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7eXZg1We8Sw). This brings me to my point about the Constitution.


I agree with Tara that privacy is a right worth protecting. I think that she does a great job of explaining why, and its prevalence in the common law further indicates its philosophical merit. I believe that we should push legislators to pass laws to protect privacy and data. However, as things currently stand, I don't think we have a Constitutional right to privacy in and of itself. I disagree with Tara when she claims that "it is not that this right gives rise to a 'zone of privacy' within the home, but rather, the Amendment is making explicit one application of the fundamental right to property in ourselves, which extends to control of our homes. It is because we have an exclusive right to control our person and our property that we have the Third Amendment." I take the inverse approach; I believe we only have a right to privacy as it pertains to our possessions because the 3rd and 4th Amendments exist, thus we only have those rights in so far as it is necessary to secure the liberties enumerated in the Bill of Rights. Sure, our philosophical right to privacy was probably why these rights were codified in the first place, but just because the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to protect people's right to privacy does not give the right to privacy itself any statutory legitimacy. Any aspect of privacy that is not absolutely necessary to properly exercise these rights is not protected by the text of the Constitution. Maybe Tara agrees with me on this and I am just reading her wrong or have a misunderstanding of what she means by a right to privacy. 


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