PPECMC2023Sextons

       In the section “The Property Functions of Whiteness, ”  Harris responds to a counterargument regarding why whiteness might not be considered a property. The argument against Harris is that property has been traditionally considered “fully alienable,” and since whiteness is not transferable, then whiteness cannot be considered a property.      Harris counter-argues that although property historically has been seen as an alienable entity, many inalienable entities can and have been assigned some property value. Harris uses the example of divorce court and how degrees utilized by one partner but paid by the other are entities to that courts can assign value. Therefore, whiteness being inalienable does not negate its function as property, but instead, as Harris writes, “paradoxically, its inalienability may be more indicative of its perceived enhanced value, rather than its disqualification as property.” (1734) Therefore, as Harris makes clear,...

Harris's claim about the deep interrelation of racial identity and property can be summed up in her narration of her grandmother's account in how “being white automatically ensured higher economic returns in the short run, as well as greater economic, political, and social security in the long run” (1713) However, while Harris provides a brilliant and accurate historical account of white privilege and the “legal protections of the existing hierarchy” (1779), it fails to suggest viable alterations that both, in theory, and de-facto make a more equal and just state of affairs. Even after conceding to the claims made by Harris across chapters I to IV, her case for affirmative action falls apart pretty quickly. Disregarding academics such as Thomas Sowell from the Hoover Institution who empirically nullify the case for affirmative action, Harris’s conceptual claims for affirmative action are crowded with flaws and contradictions. For example, after claiming that “black identity doe...

I found Harris’ “Whiteness as Property” to be an incredibly compelling and well illustrated piece, providing both conceptual and substantive arguments–though I wish I could have read more on implementing affirmative action programming. While it is not the author’s job to provide a completely flushed-out procedure, I do wonder how affirmative action will effectively be situated into a legal system that is still white-dominated and white-benefitting. Harris produced this piece in 1993. Racism continues to persist within the United States legal systems. In a 2018 report to the United Nations, the Sentencing Project provided vast empirical evidence on racial inequities within the “colorblind” American judicial system. I’m curious as to how crucial solutions such as affirmative action can be substantively instituted into our system whereas “the levels of white resistance dictate(d) the parameters of the remedy.” (Harris 1756)  A persistent reliance on what Harris’ calls “formal equality...

I read Part II of this essay with a lot of skepticism. Though you should never judge a book by its cover, this work's title alone is enough to raise some eyebrows. After doing such a deep dive into Locke's account of property, it was hard to imagine how whiteness could be considered property. While I agreed with the general claims made in the introduction and the first couple of sections of Part II, I couldn't accept that whiteness could be interpreted as property. After Harris's dissection of antebellum America and the slave trade, it was clear to me how whiteness—and non-whiteness—evolved from just a concept to something that had real weight. Harris did a really good job explaining how race became conjoined with legal status. As she says, there was a "move from 'slave' and 'free' to 'Black' and 'white' as polar constructs marked an important step in the social construction of race" (1718). At this point, I understood that whit...

Harris presents an account of rights, equality, property, neutrality, and power that differs sharply from Locke's (Harris 1778). While Locke's view raises issues of its own, Harris's account contains a number of lacunae in regard to her basis for what characterizes a legitimate exercise of power. Harris also rejects Locke's belief that " the beginning of politic society depends upon the consent of the individuals, to join into, and make one society" (Locke 56). Harris discards this premise because "within this framework, social group has no place" (Harris 1762). Harris believes social groups play a key role in determining the distribution of power. If not individual consent, what legitimates government? Harris also understands equality differently than Locke. While Locke understands equality as the  "equal right, that every man hath, to his natural freedom " (Locke 31), Harris describes "real equality" as primarily material:  ...

 Throughout Whiteness as Property, Harris makes many compelling arguments about the historical preservation of whiteness as a means of maintaining exclusive rights and privileges. Her points connecting white identification to white supremacy within our expectations of white racial identity as “pure” and “without contamination,” alongside her examination of Brown II’s shortcomings: “selecting desegregation as the sole remedy was the consequence of defining the injury solely as racial separation,” were sobering and eye-opening.  Another claim that I found insightful but debatable was that “whiteness as the the basis for a valid claim… is a further legitimation of whiteness as identity, status, and property.  Treating white identity as no different from any other group identity when, at its core, whiteness is based on the racial subordination ratifies existing white privilege by making it the referential base line.” While I agree that only viewing issues from a universal ass...

From Locke's Second Treatise, we learn that humans have both a right of nature and a law of nature, where our right is protected and the law is unbreakable. However, when considering Harris's argument that the right to whiteness as property should not be protected, it might seem like she goes against Lockean reason. After all, to be white is a part of one's self, the most fundamental property. We all have a right to protect our property and no one can take our property with our consent. However, when considering the law of nature, Harris' argument for denying protection to whiteness as property falls more in line with Locke's beliefs.  The law of nature requires that all humans treat others the same way as they would treat themselves for we are all equal (the golden rule). Nevertheless, in Part I and II, Harris describes how the notion of whiteness is inherently based on the oppression and subordination of others. The systems of slavery, Jim Crow laws, and even anti...

What fascinated me the most about this reading was Harris’ account of the relationship between power, customs, reification, legitimation, and the law. Based on her argument, a harmful evolution exists of concepts like whiteness becoming reified through customs and legitimated into law. The consequence of this process is that “the law masks what is the chosen as natural; it obscures the consequence of social selection as inevitable” (1777). Even though “whiteness” began as an “ideological proposition imposed through subordination of ‘others,’” it has acquired a meaning and privilege that operates with “phantom objectivity” (1730). This then makes it harder to challenge deeply ingrained customs and laws that have become masked with the veil of being “natural.” Harris asks us to examine the “dynamic and multifaceted relationship among custom, command, and law” (1727). Two examples that illustrate this concept are the seizures of Mashpee land and the use of arguments around “merit” or int...

    Within “Whiteness as Property”, Cheryl Harris speaks to the limitations of the United States’ legal system in addressing inequality. In particular, Harris mentions Brown I , which reversed the infamous “separate but equal” concept in Plessy . While this court case aptly rejected white privilege a legal right, it failed to account for “de-facto white privilege not mandated by law” (Harris 1753). Harris explains that one reason the court might not have fully addressed the full spectrum of existing abuses was a fear that the judicial branch would have been too involved within the operations of public schools. She pushes back against this fear, remarking that “it is unacceptable for the Court to ignore the infringement of violation of Constitutionality protected right because of concerns about the proper institutional role of the judiciary” (Harris 1753). Within this blog post, I want to push back against this premise that it was unfair for the judiciary to be cognizant of the...

Group A Livia Kirby Camille Bradley Gio Henry Group B Ella Carlos Josh Noah Tutu Sambhav Pairings for the first two weeks: Livia and Carlos Kirby and Noah Camille and Tutu Henry and Sambhav Bradley and Ella Gio and Josh

While the first four chapters of his Second Treatise were very interesting, I was most intrigued by Locke's account of property rights in the fifth chapter. His argument attempts to mesh together the fundamental principles described earlier (e.g., State of Nature, State of War, etc.) to tackle a particular issue. Locke begins his argument with the premise that all men have equal rights regarding the provisions of the earth as God gave these provisions to "mankind in common" (Section 26). This premise reveals Locke's conception of equality and leads to his discussion of the importance of labor in defining property rights. According to Locke, when one adds "the labor of his body, and the work of his hands" (Section 27) to the fruits of the earth, the fruits are removed from the State of Nature and become his property. He extends his argument by noting limitations on the amassing of these fruits, stating that these fruits should be used "to any advantage o...

On page 13, Locke claims that “princes and rulers of independent governments all through the world, are in a state of nature…for it is not every compact that puts an end to the state of nature between men, but only this one of agreeing together mutually to enter into one community.”  This excerpt seems contradictory to Locke’s characterization of the state of nature. Through Locke’s eyes, the state of nature is one of equality, mutual love, and obligation amongst men, and one where “there cannot be any such subordination among us, that may authorize us to destroy one another as if we were made for one another’s uses” (pp. 9). A government with princes as rulers, such as a monarchy, does not necessarily follow that definition. Monarchs subordinate their subjects to their power and may leverage that power to destroy civilians as they see fit. So… what then is Locke’s definition of the state of nature? Furthermore, Locke’s viewpoint that mutual agreements end a state of nature is not ...

  John Locke’s 1690 Second Treatise unmistakably provided the foundation for the United States’ rebellion against Great Britain, and the Founding Fathers’ pursuit of a restricted governmental body. The arguments in Chapter V, “Of Property,” also demonstrate that in his civil society, “some animals are more equal than others.” (Orwell) All men subsist equally in “perfect freedom” in his State of Nature, where “men are not bound to submit to the unjust will of another.” (Locke 8, 13) But once man appropriates property, borne through his laboring of material, he has a right to such property. Locke provided bounds to property rights, namely that man should not own in excess, where materials would spoil, leave nothing for the rest of men, or be possessed without requisite labor. Money diminishes such limitations. Because money allows for the trade of perishable property, man’s conquest for unlimited property was now reasonable. As he wrote: “And if he also bartered away plums, that wou...

Locke begins with the idea that the state of nature is that of freedom to do anything one pleases without the consent or permission of another. Given this freedom, humans then use Reason to decide what actions and decision to make that will best "preserve" them. However, unlike Hobbes, Locke does as easily assume that this freedom extends to the lives of others. Instead, Locke argues that since all humans are equal, all born to the "same advantages of nature and the use of the same faculties" (Ch. II, Par. 4), it would only make sense that other people would also seek the same happiness, safety, and prosperity that one would also desire. As such, harming others would be detrimental to others as much as it would be to ourselves. This is Locke's basis for the Law of Nature: an obligation that mankind not "harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions" (Ch. II, Par. 6). Of course, to protect the wellbeing of all of mankind it is necessary that...

Smith clearly defines the two principles which induce meant into a civil society as authority and utility. His justification for this claim contains assumptions about human nature that run in direct contrast to Hobbes’. Where do their perspectives conflict, and what does this conflict reveal? Describing authority, Smith makes clear that superior abilities in mind (among wealth, strength, family status, and age) give man authority over another. I agree with this claim, as I submit to the authority of my professors assuming they posses more wisdom on their respective course than I do. Yet, the underlying assumption of men respecting the various levels of intelligence and submitting to the highest is in direct contrast to Hobbes’ view of men as too egotistical to respect a superior mental capacity: “for such nature of men that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more eloquent… yet they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves. For they see their ...

      I like Locke's argumentation throughout the first five chapters of his Second Treatise a lot. I think it is very sound, he constructs a great refutation of Filmer's "divine right of kings" in the first chapter, and he cleverly presents a formulation for the notion of property. However, I have many objections to chapter two wherein he explains what he believes is the state of nature. Funnily enough, it is because Locke's state of nature is so unconvincing that I have a greater appreciation for Hobbes's state of nature. My main problem with chapter two is Locke's law of nature.       As professor Hurley pointed out on Tuesday, Locke doesn't believe that liberty is license. Liberty, for Locke, is the freedom to act out your will onto yourself and your possessions without having to depend on someone else's permission. This is different from Hobbes's understanding of liberty—no external force can stop you from doing what you want. While Hobbes...

Both Locke and Hobbes begin with a description of the state of nature to describe man’s condition and relationships with one another. However, both philosophers come to different conclusions about human behavior and why government is an antidote to the state of nature.  Hobbes asserts that in a state of nature, without a common power to submit to, men are in a “condition which is called war, and such a war as is of every man against every man” (76). This state arises because all men are self-interested and motivated by “the preservation of his own nature” (79). However, since “nature hath made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind” (74), each individual’s pursuit of self-preservation can ultimately conflict with one another’s. In this state of nature, with no common power, no property, no law, and thus, no justice, industry cannot thrive, and competing acts of individuals pursuing their right of nature lead to a state of war. Thus, the origin of society and governance emer...

    Locke defines the State of Nature as a state in which everyone has the equal right to do as they wish, as long as it does not impede others’ rights. As he states, individuals do not have the license to violate others’ liberties. Locke extends his point by stating that the State of Nature leads to the structure of natural laws observed by all, even if not understood. A basis for Locke’s understanding of property can be found in this explanation of natural laws.      Locke emphasizes that for a common entity to become one’s property, one must insert some form of labor into the good. For example, in order to monetize and commercialize a reservoir, one must put in the labor of building a dam. Therefore, it becomes a natural law, or in other words, a norm, that whoever puts effort into the common good how to have claims to call it their property. If this stipulation of labor was not universally accepted, or in other words, a natural law, then property rights coul...

On the Succession of Power In the  Second Treatise of Government , Locke made some controversial claims about the origin and succession of power. Locke opened Book II arguing that Adam’s relationship to God gave him no authority over his children and dominion over Earth. Further, he argued that Adam’s heirs, if determinable, also possessed no right to authority or dominion over Earth. These opening statements reveal Locke’s hesitancy regarding whether people can inherit and transfer authority. To Locke, one’s connection to God, no matter however powerful, does not elevate someone to a supreme status of authority. Additionally, a connection by blood does not entitle a person to control over others. If people cannot, at least originally (true sense of the word), inherit power from those before them, how then do they accumulate power? Most obviously, Locke answered this question through his comments on labor and property. Throughout his treatise, Locke insinuated that one measure to a...

John Locke and Adam Smith highlight two distinct accounts of the origins of and relationships between inequality, property, and government. Locke asserts that the state of nature is one " of equality , wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal" (Locke 8). Locke uses the word "equality" to describe a type of natural equality where no person has disproportionate power over another. Thus, for Locke, equality is a natural phenomenon. Likewise, Locke argues that property is a natural phenomenon that emerges from the state of nature: " Whatsoever then [man] removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property" (Locke 19). For Locke, property is central to human nature and not dependent on government. That said, Locke believes that government has a role to play in ensuring property rights.  Locke describes civil government as ...

For Hobbes, the Right of Nature is a right “of doing anything which…he shall conceive to be the aptest means” to “the preservation of his own nature.”(79) I want most of all to preserve myself, reason is a tool for telling me how best to preserve myself, so reason dictates this Right of Nature. Such a right does not come with a corresponding duty, as rights typically understood do (My right to property comes with a duty to respect yours, etc.). I have a Right of Nature, and I recognize that you have a Right of Nature, but my recognition of your Right is perfectly consistent with killing you and taking your stuff if that is the best strategy for preserving myself, and your recognition of my Right is perfectly consistent with your killing me. Reason is just a tool for getting what I want, my overarching want is for my own preservation, hence, it is rational to pursue to pursue my overarching want by any means possible, even killings you – the Right of Nature. For Locke, the Law of...