PPECMC2023Sextons

In his third chapter of Development as Freedom , Amartya Sen describes the varied “capability sets” people should have to express freedom in their own “alternative functioning combinations.” (75) In this argument, Sen notes how without the capability to choose otherwise, functioning may remain, but freedom does not. Functioning is considered as the “various things a person may value doing or being.” (75) Sen brings up the example of those enduring starvation vs. another who is fasting: both have the same function (not eating), but not the same capability to do so. Without the existence and access to a capability function, there is no representative freedom to achieve. Whether or not one materializes those options does not matter so much, rather  it is a question of whether they have the option to do so. The notion of capability sets play directly into preference fulfillment, in such that our preferences are affected by what opportunities for actualization we possess. This combinati...

When reading Sen’s argument, his requirement of “transparency” as an instrumental freedom reminded me of the reciprocity clause Rawls, Shelby, and others have highlighted as required for a legitimate and just society. Sen’s argument for development as freedom moves away from the classic “medical model” as development as gains in economic structures. As Sen argues, utilitarianism and other similar schools of thought ignore the importance of development’s role in expanding individual freedoms. As Sen argues, “expansion of freedom is viewed as both (r) the primary end and (2) the principal means of development.” In chapter two, Sen argues that development must consider five instrumental freedoms, especially in light of their interconnected nature. As Sen writes, “The claim that freedom is not only the primary object of development but also its principal means relates particularly to these linkages.” I will argue that the most important of these freedoms might be the transparency guarantee...

Amartya Sen's capability approach, elucidated in Development as Freedom posits that human welfare and development are contingent upon expanding individuals' capabilities. However, the intrinsic value of capabilities is debatable; one might argue that preference satisfaction is more crucial to human welfare.  Sen defines development as "a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy" (Sen, 1999, p. 3), emphasizing that enhancing capabilities allows individuals to choose the lives they desire. Nevertheless, the idea that capabilities matter intrinsically raises questions. The true essence of human welfare may not lie in the mere ability to satisfy preferences, but rather in the actual satisfaction of those preferences.  For instance, consider two individuals with identical capabilities: one actively utilizes these capabilities to satisfy their preferences, while the other does not. According to the capability approach, both individuals would have similar le...

In Chapter 2 of  Development as Freedom,  Amartya Sen highlights how varying forms of freedom are interconnected and can be leveraged as the means of development, not just the ends. Sen affirms that there are two ways in which freedom can be used as a means of development: "support-led" and "growth-mediated." The latter "works  through  fast economic growth... and also on the utilization of the enhanced economic prosperity to expand the relevant social services" (46). The former "works through a program of skillful social support of health care, education, and other relevant social arrangements" (46). He cites examples of support-led growth, demonstrating how focusing on social arrangements increases prosperity as measured through life expectancy, and thus concludes that GNP per Capita is not an accurate measure of freedom and development.  On page 48, he brings up a common rebuttal to support-led growth, which questions how support-led growth is...

  Within Development as Freedom , Amartya Sen discusses the role the market plays within different societies and how it impacts different interest groups. Although there are many groups of people who are beneficiaries of the smooth functioning of the market, there are groups of people who are harmed by its functioning (Sen 120). Sen suggests that a prominent issue occurs when these latter groups obtain political power and influence, as they can create policies which inhibit the market’s purpose in a society’s economy. On way to limit the influence of markets is through imposing strict trade barriers, therefore insulating companies from external competition. In doing so, monopolistic product units flourish. The legitimization of these types of trade policies could potentially increase product prices, dilute quality, and inhibit innovation (121). Though I agree with Sen, and his promotion for the market (and subsequently more liberalized trade), I am curious how Sen would consider th...

In this blog post, I intend to make the case for what Amartya Sen calls "financial conservatism" (Sen 137) as well as what I will call "legislative conservatism." My argument will proceed from Sen's framework in which "substantive individual freedoms are taken to be critical" (18). Using Sen's argument, I urge caution in both the financial and legislative realms in order to ensure that substantive freedoms are not jeopardized by careless government action. In doing so, I attempt to demonstrate the possible tension between what Sen calls "political freedoms" (38) and other types of substantive freedoms. Sen explains that "the case for financial conservatism lies, to a great extent, in the recognition that price stability is important and that it can be deeply threatened by fiscal indulgence and irresponsibility" (138). Sen sees financial conservatism mainly as a solution to protect against the threat of widespread macroeconomic i...

               In Shelby’s discussion and description of how ghettos came to be and how they function, favelas kept returning as a potential tangible example that proves many of Shelby’s points. Favelas are informal settlements that reside on the outskirts of urban centers. Favelas were established by formerly enslaved people that found themselves in a society that worked to impoverish them due to prejudice systematically. In response, slowly, favelas were communally erected to better serve the community's needs without having to rely on institutions that did not suit their needs. This notion of the right to refuse in a system that aims to impoverish one’s group and instead create a system that serves and values the work done seems very similar to Shelby’s argument that Black Americans have the right to refuse to participate in an unfair system.  Shelby writes, "Group self-segregation need not be entirely voluntary, as it may be partly ...

(Really sorry for the late post, thinking of what to post took me much longer than anticipated) I think the key to promoting a residential integration account to solving concentrated disadvantage is clarifying what one is advocating for is optional residential integration.   The reason I side with Shelby taking issue with Anderson’s account is because “she suggests that evidence [in favor of integration] as decisive and suggests that this evidence entitles state officials and institutional authorities to override the residential preferences… of blacks who reject integration” (72).   But from my opinion, Shelby is too quick to “doubt that residential integration is a necessary means to [a multicultural society of equals]” (79). I see the benefits of an optional residential integration as a tool to use alongside community development to reduce inequality. I think Shelby would agree with this opinion, but he somewhat rejects the melting-pot ideal of integration I don’t think he ...

In Chapter Two of Dark Ghettos: Injustice, Dissent, and Reform , Tommie Shelby considers the possible justifications behind forced integration and self-segregation as responses to addressing poverty and the concentration of disadvantages in black ghettos, concluding that forced integration is wrong and self-segregation can be a valid response to injustice. Overall, I agree with Shelby's points in this chapter and believe much of this chapter can apply to the real practice of gentrification I believe the distinction Shelby continuously makes throughout chapter two between integration in the Jim Crow era and residential integration cannot be overstated. That is, it is essential that people have the choice to live in racially pluralistic communities, not that people must live in racially diverse communities. Of course, Shelby provides various reasons why forced integration is wrong, but I would like to explore how forced integration, in the real pattern of gentrification, can further ...

In Dark Ghettos , Tommie Shelby argues that Black people in inner-city communities have limited agency for upward mobility due to structural oppression and systemic injustices (or one could say limited control of their outcomes). He claims that “these problems (violence, street crime, concentrated poverty, etc.) are a consequence of injustice” (4) and “no reasonable person could think that the plight of the ghetto poor is their own fault.” (9) At the same time, he argues that individual and collective agency is warranted and to an extent necessary (58) in its use for political emancipation through dissent and resistance, since the system “unjustly disadvantages” (19) them. However, this emphasis on agency as an impetus for justice may overlook the systemic barriers that prevent individuals (and groups of individuals) from fully exercising their agency. In this blog post, I argue that Shelby’s arguments end up risking blaming Black people for their own suffering by assuming the extent o...

In his section on “The Duty of Justice,” Tommie Shelby contends that “The duty of justice is a moral requirement all are bound by. It demands, most fundamentally, that each of us respect and support just institutions, particularly those that lay claim to our allegiance and from which we benefit” (57). Shelby goes on to state that “the weakest demand that the duty of justice imposes… is that we not be indifferent to societal injustices” (58). This section implies a duty of justice in black communities, which goes hand-in-hand with his claims that, while blacks are not responsible for their unjust conditions, they are responsible for morally responding to their unjust conditions. While I do not necessarily disagree with the fact that we all should have a duty to speak out against injustice, there are some contradictions found in Shelby’s claim on the duty to help correct injustices, especially when analyzing his claims through a Contractarian lens. Through a Contractarian lens, we concei...

In Shelby's sixth chapter of Dark Ghettos, I was struck by his argument of self-determination for the ghetto poor's notion of fulfilling "work". Shelby argues that work can be understood in more contexts than in wage-based employment. This typical, narrow American mindset of what qualifies "work" is deeply rooted in unjust discrimination forms, especially with in the low-wage market on matters related to racial and gender discrimination. As an example, he notes the ignoring of the very intensive and crucial work of home care. Most women are expected to take on home duties, without pay or the respect of their efforts as legitimated occupations. In so many words, the efforts of marginalized people is reduced based on an element of identity within their "work". But Shelby argues that this assumption viewpoint neglects the distinction of a conscious refusal to contribute vs. a lack of motivation. Oftentimes, those marginalized are written off a lazy or...

Shelby's fascinating account of the perpetuation of the injustices plaguing ghettos considers reasons for which the ghetto poor might refuse to work (and are justified in doing so). Of the reasons he offers, three, he believes, cannot be accommodated without changing the structure of US society (192): the injustice objection, the exploitation objection, and the expressive harm objection. This blog post will focus on the exploitation objection and propose further extensions of Shelby's explanation of this objection.  Shelby argues that the ghetto poor may refuse to work because work requirements are exploitative, taking advantage of the poor's "weakness and vulnerabilities" and forcing the poor to work under unjust conditions. Shelby attributes these vulnerabilities to the historical mistreatment of African Americans (e.g. slavery and Jim Crow Laws), which resulted in the ghetto poor becoming a source of cheap and exploitable labor.  He extends this argument by cha...

  When is engaging in the illicit economy, as Shelby calls it on page 177, (e.g., selling drugs, gang activity, etc.) permissible? Is it ever permissible? Prior to reading Shelby's chapter on work, I had a strong belief that the basic structure and the job market were inequitable and unjust. This conviction is one that I held even from a very young age. Growing up as a young Black man in the U.S., I was exposed to numerous stories about people being unable to find work for a myriad of reasons. The jobs they were able to find were often demeaning, extremely difficult to get to, and unsustainable.  Alongside these stories I heard about people unable to find work, I also heard stories of people creating their own work in the illicit economy. These stories were pervasive in the media I consumed, and because I knew people in similar positions, I was able to put faces to these general stories. Since I could relate closely to these stories, I grew up having more empathy for peop...

  I find great value in Shelby's ability to go from theory to application in this book. He looks at one of America's most pressing historical and modern problems -- Black ghettos -- and tries to look at the problem through a lens of liberal-egalitarian theory and conceptions of justice. He does this by using nonideal theory  specifically, and rather than spending his time deriving an ideal framework (for which he relies on Rawls) he figures out how to identify where injustice  is occurring in the racial phenomenon that plagues our nation. Furthermore, he does this not by looking at material consequences of unjust structures --a method many use that lead them to trying to figure out how to fix the most urgent problems, typically absolute poverty. The latter method seems similar to utilitarianism. One looks at the status of society and sees that there is suffering going on and tries to cure the suffering as best possible. There seems to be great utility / good in this frame...

  In his chapter on work, Shelby outlines a fascinating and compelling account of why the urban black poor’s refusal to participate in a workforce with only limited and demeaning work is justifiable. The section on Work and Human Flourishing was particularly resonant for its account of the American obsession with a hard work ethic. Within the United States, there is a pervasive --and what I will argue is an insidious-- ideology of hard work and “picking yourself up from your bootstraps.” This story and valuation of human worth operate as an ideology because it is a “widely held set of associated beliefs and implicit judgments that misrepresent significant social realities and that function, through this distortion, to bring about or perpetuate unjust social relations.” Our obsession with “hard work” and wealth accumulation is central to the dominant conception of the good and perception of human flourishing. Yet, this ideology ignores the social and economic realities of less pri...

In this blog post, I attempt to challenge Tommie Shelby's argument in Dark Ghettos that "the ghetto poor would not be wronging their fellow citizens were they to choose not to work and to rely on public funds for material support" (Shelby 176). I do so by invoking liberal arguments from John Rawls and Arthur Ripstein. At the beginning of his chapter on work, Shelby makes clear his intentions to challenge the justifications for "mandating work as a condition of receiving welfare benefits" (175). Shelby explains that work requirements for welfare benefits are typically justified on the basis that work is "a moral or civic duty" (175). Shelby rejects this justification on liberal grounds, arguing that since "work... is a central element of a broad conception of human flourishing" (184), and no "liberal-democratic state can legitimately enforce any particular conception of the good" (185), then it follows that a liberal democratic stat...

  2 Within Dark Ghettos: Injustice, Dissent, and Reform , Tommie Shelby makes the argument that the ghetto poor often have legitimate reasons to refuse to work. He presents several reasons that justify this claim. I will only present two circumstances here for the sake of consciousness. First, Shelby articulates that the ghetto poor may refuse to work because the jobs available do not provide enough for a livable wage (191). Second, Shelby explains that some among the ghetto poor might reject work requirements because low-skilled workers do not possess the right to organize, form and/or join labor unions. Without this right, the ghetto poor lack the leverage to negotiate for benefits or reasonable compensation (191). Both of these reasons for refusing to work arise because the United State’s basic structure is grossly unjust. Though the instilled notion of reciprocity with the US might look down upon these actions, it is hardly reasonable to expect the ghetto poor to work within a ...