PPECMC2023Sextons

Regarding the concept of political emancipation in relation to religion, Marx claims that “if we find that even in the country of complete political emancipation, religion not only exists, but displays a fresh and vigorous vitality, that is proof that the existence of religion is not in contradiction to the perfection of the state." Marx uses the United States to prove this point, and ask a general rule of thumb, I would agree that the existence of religion and political emancipation are not mutually exclusive. But there is some grey area within the definition of “political emancipation” that should be further explored to show how the concept can be used as a tool to privilege or discriminate against certain religions within an overall goal of secularism. For Marx, political emancipation is occurs when “In its own form, in the manner characteristic of its nature… a state emancipates itself from religion by emancipating itself from the state religion – that is to say, by the state ...

In On the Jewish Question, Marx claims that the secular democratic state is some sort of contemporary version of the religious illusion, maintaining that it holds the same relation of authority to civil society which exists between the religious sphere and the profane world. (Dupre, Marx’s social critique of culture, 25) However, I challenge the narrow understanding of Marx’s essay simply as a critique of liberalism, and question whether his essay On the Jewish Question can be interpreted as a more fundamental claim against Judaism. Essentially, I am curious as to whether Marx’s characterization of Jews and Judaism is simply a tool/peg on which to hang his criticism of the liberal state, or a reflection of a more fundamentally grounded anti-Semitic belief. This is important not only because Marx’s anti-Semitic views need challenging, but also because Marx’s analysis of the Jewish question leads to an understanding of his notion of emancipation . After a quick google search, it seems ...

In "Discourse on the Origin of Inequality", after providing his account of history and human development, Rousseau gets to a point where humans have decided to unite to create laws and uphold justice "in order to protect the weak from oppression, restrain the ambitious, and assure everyone of possessing what belongs to him" (69). This idea arrives from the ambition of the rich to protect their property and resources, realizing the right of power does not protect them or their belongings. Rousseau then explains that everyone else, swayed by this argument and unaware of the possibility of employing the right of power against the rich, readily agree to enter into a political society to protect their self-interest. Rousseau describes this process as granting "new fetters to the weak and new forces to the rich" (70) and forever enabling ambition's uniform control over everyone, rich or poor. Rousseau then provides his solution to this problem in the form of...

  For as much as I didn't understand a lot of this reading—and trust me, I was lost throughout most of reading this—there was one part that I really liked.      The political emancipation of the Jew or the Christian—of the religious man in general—is the  emancipation of the state from Judaism, Christianity , and religion in general. The state emancipates itself from religion in its own particular way, in the mode which corresponds to its nature, by emancipating itself from the state religion; that is to say, by giving recognition to no religion and affirming itself purely and simply as a state. To be politically emancipated from religion is not to be finally and completely emancipated from religion, because political emancipation is not the final and absolute form of human emancipation.     The limits of political emancipation appear at once in the fact that the state can liberate itself from a constraint without man himself being really liberate...

     What has resonated with me most from the past two readings is the philosopher's attempt at understanding the relationship between an individual and the collective. Both Rousseau and Marx (in addition to others like Locke) attempt to rationalize and understand the fundamental relationship between an individual and the state and how an individual can maintain their rights and self-sovereignty while under a collective authority. Rousseau states that one must surrender everything to the general will to be truly free and the master of himself. The social contract and the idea of the general will is his attempt at understanding a legitimate way in which an individual can retain their freedom (and gain even more) by being under another authority.      Marx outlines a division between the political state and civil society. Civil society is the “state of need and of reason” where individuals are separated from the community, occupied by their private interests,...

  Throughout  On the Jewish Question , Karl Marx contrasts religious and political states, demonstrating their differences and incompatibility as existing in dependence on one another (especially in his denouncement of the "so-called Christian state" 36). That being said, considering Marx's ideas in light of Brettschneider's ideas of the "core values" of democracy, we can better understand how, according to Marx, religion and the political state are just different expressions of human values and ideals. In Brettschenider's writings, he explains how, intrinsically, democratic texts and institutions reflect a few core values. In Marx's account, he seems to believe religion and political states follow a similar structure, expressing specific core values differently.  This idea is best encapsulated on page 32 when Marx states:  Religion is simply the recognition of man in a roundabout fashion; that is, through an intermediary. The state is the intermedia...

 In his "On the Jewish Question," Marx provides an account of "political society" that is strikingly similar to Rousseau's: "Here, where he appears both to himself and to others as a real individual he is an illusory phenomenon. In the state, on the contrary, where he is regarded as a species-being, man is the imaginary member of an imaginary sovereignty, divested of his real, individual life, and infused with an unreal universality" (34). Rousseau follows a very similar argument that in modern society, man takes on a false appearance to increase his own power and subdue those with less power. This tendency to be "illusory" can be traced back to the value of esteem that arose during the earlier developments of man and was aggravated by property rights and growing inequality. Moreover, Rousseau's Social Contract encompasses the notion of the general will, which like the perfected state as conceived by Marx, embodies the universality of ass...

Marx, in "On the Jewish Question," draws a stark distinction between the egoistic man of civil society and the species-being of the political community. This distinction serves as the basis for his critique of civil society and his prescription for man to return to his state as a species-being. A footnote from Robert C. Tucker explains why this distinction is so essential to Marx's argument: he writes that Marx "insists more strongly than Feuerbach that since... 'species-consciousness' defines the nature of man, man is only living and acting authentically (i.e. in accordance with his nature) when he lives and acts deliberately as a 'species-being,' that is, as a social  being" (Tucker 34). Marx seems to imply that man's natural state is a social one. After all, he derides egoistic man for being "an individual separated from the community, withdrawn into himself, wholly preoccupied with his private interest and acting in accordance with h...

  On Monday night, I attended Harvard Law Professor Noah Feldman’s Athenaeum Talk entitled: “The Broken Constitution: Lincoln, Slavery & the Refounding of America”. Within Feldman’s talk, he argued that Lincoln repeatedly violated the Constitution throughout his presidency, and that these violations enabled Lincoln to rewrite the Constitution, and save its place in the American governmental system. The premise of breaking something in order to save it is a rather difficult pill to swallow. Thus, Lincoln appealed to his Christian audience and used a Biblical story to justify his actions. He spoke about the role of messiah, and how his coming imposed a transition from the laws of the Old Testament to a new law of the New Testament. Though the New Testament replacement of the Old Testament could have been viewed as the abolishment of the laws of the prophets, it was understood as a fulfillment of these laws and a transition to laws more pertinent to the needs of that present socie...

Smith differentiates beneficence and justice primarily by establishing that it is inappropriate to enforce the practice of beneficence by merited punishment, but is is appropriate to utilize merited punishment when Justice is neglected. Therefore, justice forms a stabler ground to establish human society: “it is the main pillar that upholds the whole edifice.” Smith also claims that if not for justice, men would, “like wild beasts, be ready at all times to fly upon [another], and a man would enter an assembly of men as he enters a den of lions.” Smith also characterizes justice as a principle used in evaluating individual (rather than societal) problems.  " That [justice] is not a regard to the preservation of society, which originally interests us in the punishment of crimes committed against individuals, may be demonstrated by obvious considerations.” These "obvious considerations" include how our demand for punishment stems from a concern for the individual (rathe...

 A question that cuts across the writings of both Blackburn and Smith is: what virtues build a society? For this blog post, I will consider what Blackburn calls "cooperation" and what Smith calls "beneficence" to be similar. Beneficence is doing good to another, whereas cooperation is an instance where good is done to the other, mutually. Therefore, cooperation is a type of beneficence. In examining Smith's account of justice and beneficence, we find that Smith does not think beneficence is essential to building society, stating, "It is an ornament which embellishes, not the foundation which supports the building" (Smith, 86), with the 'building' being society. He continues to say that "Justice, on the contrary, is the main pillar that upholds the whole edifice." From these excerpts, we can conceive that Smith believes systems of justice create a society. While beneficence helps support a just society, it is not essential. Furthermore...

Smith begins ch. III of this reading by reiterating his belief that "all the members of human society stand in need for each others assistance" (2.3.1.1). In rationalizing why a rational agent may seek to cooperate with others in society, self-interest and sympathies help explain these relationships. For Smith, cooperation within society can be explained "from a sense of its utility, without any mutual love or affection" (2.3.1.2). Society can be a tool to be used by individuals to further their own self-interests and maintain their self-preservation. Although cooperation in society fueled by love, friendship, and other virtues can lead to a wonderful society, Smith does not require that these virtues be necessary for a functional society. Instead, Smith only asks that a society uphold justice. For Smith, justice remains neutral to the "emotions of compassion" for the injured and violator, instead holding "compassion which [one would] feel for mankind...

     In Smith’s chapter IV, “Recapitulation of the Foregoing Chapters,” he argues the necessary means for sympathizing with another’s resentment or gratitude. In terms of evaluating the worthiness of resentment, Smith believes that one must divide this method into three segments. One, the “affection from which the action proceeds,”. In other words, does the motive or driving factor have merit in causing such an exercise of resentment? Two, the act itself must be in accordance with scaled retribution to the original harm done. And finally, we must determine the receiver of this resentment as the act’s “proper and suitable object.” (46) These terms help each man to properly evaluate the worthiness of resentment, to temper its reasonability and applicability.      I n many ways, instructed analysis on the providing/receiving of gratitude or resentment goes to directly support Smith’s concept of natural societal bounds. He writes that we are constantly eva...

 On page 79, Smith writes, "the violation of justice is injury: it does real and positive hurt to some particular persons," and thus it is a virtue that, unlike beneficence, warrants resentment if we fail to fulfill it. Upon reading this, I immediately thought, well how are you defining justice?  It became very clear in the following pages that Smith's conception of justice is nearly identical to Locke's Law of Nature. On page 80, he writes, "Among equals each individual is naturally, and antecedent to the institution of civil government , regarded as having a right both to defend himself from injuries, and to exact a certain degree of punishment for those which have been done to them." He continues to say that justice is only those transgressions which spectators would have the right to, and would be compelled to, punish whoever commits them. After this, he explains that no one has a right to advance their own happiness at the expense of someone else's...

       What struck me as most resonant in this text was Smith’s explanation of the varying degrees of virtues and the different considerations and requirements accorded to beneficence vs. justice. Smith writes that beneficence is the proper object of our gratitude but is a positive virtue, meaning they deserve reward, but should not provoke resentment if absent. Thus, kindness deserves our gratitude and praise, but we cannot coerce individuals into acts of kindness, nor can we condemn them for simply being neutral. On the other hand, justice operates as more of a negative virtue; you exhibit the virtue by not acting in certain ways that harm others. Therefore, upholding this virtue does not invite congratulations, but violating it provokes justified resentment.     C onsequently, justice is something that you can coerce and regulate others into abiding by. Similarly, justice operates differently in our own feelings of obligation. Compared to other soci...

Adam Smith, in  The Theory of Moral Sentiments , argues that justice emerges from a bottom-up interpretation of our sentiments rather than from a top-down understanding of the general interest of society. In doing so, he reveals how our sentimental interests are inherently parochial and not cosmopolitan. Smith begins by establishing that each man's primary concern is his own welfare. He writes that "every man is, no doubt, by nature, first and principally recommended to his own care; and as he is fitter to take care of himself than of any other person, it is fit and right that it should be so" (Smith 82). For Smith, it is necessary and proper that each man prioritize his own particular welfare. Taking a page out of the book of his good friend David Hume , Smith writes that people will be less concerned with "the death of another person, with whom we have no particular connexion" than "a very insignificant disaster which has befallen ourselves" (Smith 8...

In Chapter II of Part II of his Theory of Moral Sentiments , Smith discusses the virtue of justice and the sense of remorse that arises as a result of violations of justice. He begins his argument with the seemingly empirical claim that "man...has a natural love for society, and desires that the union of mankind should be preserved for its own sake, and thought he himself was to derive no benefit from it" (II.ii.3). He then extrapolates from this that "we frequently have occasion to confirm our natural sense of the propriety and fitness of punishment, by reflecting how necessary it is for preserving the order of society " (II.ii.3).  A striking claim arises: in having the disposition to save one who has been injured by another, man "counterbalances the impulse of this weak  and partial  humanity by the dictates of a humanity that is more generous and comprehensive " (II.ii.3). This begs the question: what justification does Smith provide for the notion th...

Beneficence and Justice are two virtues. Beneficence involves the appropriate experience of certain social passions; justice involves the appropriate experience of one particular unsocial passion, resentment. How Smith understands resentment, its relationship to punishment, and their relationship to justice, is crucial to his understanding of justice itself. Chapter I involves a comparison and contrast of the two virtues. It is also the chapter in which Smith articulates the appropriate role of the state as restraining injustice, but also, in carefully delimited cases, as commanding beneficence (“Mutual good offices”). Chapter II contains Smith’s initial account of the appropriate interplay between justice and “the race for wealth,” in particular his account of the role of appropriately shaped sentiments of justice in structuring our participation in the race for wealth. Chapter III has two parts. The first is Smith’s argument that although beneficence is necessary for a ...

  Within section II chapter II of The Theory of Moral Sentiments , Smith explains how a man who has violated the sacred laws of justice reacts to his past actions. After a man’s “passion is gratified…he can enter into none of the motives which influenced it” (Smith 81). Therefore, man is subject to reflection contingent upon the sentiments of his peers. He must sympathize with them, and he, himself, becomes the object of his own hatred. Such a circumstance wills upon man to retreat from society into solitude. But ultimately, Smith argues, man recognizes that “solitude is still more dreadful than society” and returns to presence of mankind and the sentiments of shame and fear that go along with it (Smith 81). I am curious why Smith suggests that solitude is more dreadful than society. Smith remarks that in solitude, man’s own thoughts present him with nothing but what is “black, unfortunate, and disastrous, the melancholy forebodings of incomprehensible misery and ruin” (Smith 81)...

While reading Smith’s Section III Chapter II titled “ Of the origin of Ambition, and the distinction of Ranks ,” I kept thinking about the relationship between capital owners and laborers. Smith writes a lot about why we as a society value the ruling class and keep them in place. Smith attributes this to the innate nature of sympathy present in all humans. Smith writes, “It is because mankind are disposed to sympathize more entirely with our joy than with our sorrow, that we make parade of our riches, and conceal our poverty.” (50)  However, Smith’s argument raised one question for me: what would happen if the public was better informed about how this system was created? In other words, if the general public learned that the ruling class set up this system to benefit them and actively recognized this, would public “sympathy” change so dramatically that the ruling class would no longer be protected? Locke brings up the issue of consent regarding an individual consenting to be ruled ...

At the beginning of the reading, Smith seems to be giving a positive account of the nature of humanity. In section I, he outlines how we benefit and even search for the joy and happiness of others. By explaining an enjoyment of the joy of others, Smith insinuates that men are naturally caring and good-hearted. However, as I read on, it became clear that Smith is championing a view of human nature and behavior that is inherently selfish and, at times, ill-natured, regardless of its effect on others. This realization may seem obvious to readers other than myself, but it seemed worth highlighting as a driving force behind many of Smith’s points.  In section I, when Smith explains that the happiness and feelings of others invoke our feelings because “By the imagination, we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same person with him” (9, 2). This “sympathetic” view of human...